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ABSTRACT
The thesis consists of two loosely related essays. Both are motivated by con-
sumers’ behavior regularities in different market environments. My goal is to
show evidence of behavioral biases among decision makers and the consequences
of those behavioral effects. Given each market’s environment, I found evidence
that consumers tend to deviate from what conventional theories dictate and the
deviation may affect welfare analysis.
The first market is a non-durable experience good market. Using empirical
scanner data, we show evidence that consumers’ switching rates among brands are
higher than what brand characteristics and consumer heterogeneity can explain.
The over-switching behavior may be consistent with consumers’ brand satiation.
As a result, the consumers may benefit more from a market with more variety.
We provide a structural model of the satiation behavior and use the model to
demonstrate the model prediction as well as the welfare effect. The secondmarket
is a laboratory sequential searchmarket where sellers are allowed to use exploding
offers. We show evidence that buyersmay be affected by non-monetary incentives,
which result in a higher rejection rate for the exploding offers. After accounting for
the above mentioned “exploding offer aversion”, sellers’ optimal strategies may
be shifted. As a result, sellers tend to use lower price as well as non-exploding
offers more often.
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE BACKGROUNDAND THE IMPORTANCE OF
RESEARCH
1.1 Introduction
Modeling consumer behavior has received much attention recently since more
individual data has been made available and since conventional behavioral as-
sumptions cannot well explain individual behavior within markets. The bias
caused by inaccurate behavioral assumptions may significantly affect demand
analysis and thus further jeopardize welfare analysis.
As a result, much effort has been devoted to incorporating credible behavioral
assumptions and improving demand analysis. Depending on specific market,
those behavior assumptions includes not only conventional economic behavior
assumptions, but also bounded rationality and irrational behaviors .
This dissertation provides evidence of two behavioral effects in different mar-
ket settings. In Chapter 2, we show that consumers, especially in a non-durable
experience good market, may be subjected to a brand satiation effect when con-
suming the same brand for a while. In order to credibly identify this effect,
we utilize detailed individual level scanner data sets (for testing and controlling
for heterogeneity in estimation) in a non-durable experience good market. We
build a parsimonious non-linear mixed logit model with the assumption of satia-
tion threshold and show that the model can be better interpreted compared with
a linear state dependence bench mark model. A counter-factual experiment is
conducted to show its welfare effects: less choices leads to extra welfare loss to
consumers. In addition, from firms’ perspective, we provide a prediction model to
reduce firms’ cost and improve the matching quality when using direct marketing
1
strategies.
In Chapter 3, in a sequential search market, we show that consumers may care
about sellers’ intentions during bilateral bargaining and thus reject the “unfair”
offer–a take-it-or-leave-it offer–more during the search. Since it is almost impos-
sible to obtain (bargaining and strategy choice) data, in order to identify possible
social preference of buyers, we build a laboratory search market where sellers are
allowed to use either a normal offer or a take-or-leave-it offer–we compare hu-
man consumers with simulated consumers who only care about monetary payoff.
Comparing with theoretical optimal play with the actual play, we calculate the
rejection rate and the welfare loss. In addition, we use a modified logit quantal
response equilibrium model to describe the new equilibrium strategy. The results
may provide insights for policy makers to better evaluate the welfare change and
may also help firms to make marketing decisions.
The two behavior effects are well founded in behavioral literature. The inter-
temporal satiation effect is related to the well established marginal utility dimin-
ishing assumption. However, few research has pointed out that this effect may
encourage brand switching and standard discrete choice models don’t allow inter-
temporal satiation. The tendency to reject unfair offers (“exploding offer aver-
sion”) is loosely related to a set of “ultimatum games” in behavioral economics.
Ultimatum game is originally designed to demonstrate the possibilities of social
preferences, especially the fairness concern. However, few research has consid-
ered a general market environment and incorporated this effect. We show that
without considering those effects, demand estimation as well as welfare analysis
may be biased.
2
1.2 The Demand Side of a Market: Why do We Care?
Demand analysis is important components for multiple fields. Modern em-
pirical industrial organization is mostly concerned with market performance and
welfare effects in markets with imperfect competition. For empirical industrial
organization researchers, in order to achieve accurate second stage welfare anal-
ysis, it is important to have accurate estimation and/or prediction of the demand
before and after a policy intervention. Although a common demand system (e.g.
Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes (1995)) is able to capture flexible substitution patterns
and consumer heterogeneity cross different consumers. However, it is arbitrage
when we hope to consider past dependence or other inter-temporal effects. Our
first study (Chapter 2) proposes a parsimonious demandmodel that has flexibility
in interpreting both state dependence and satiation behavior using a threshold
parameter.
Demand side itselfmaybe of great interest for studies on consumers’ preference
and decision making. An extensive literature on demand estimation is motivated
by laboratory evidence on reference points preference, limited depth of reasoning,
social preference and other well established behavioral effects. Applying those
behavioral assumptions, we can investigate how those behavioral effects perform
in a more general and less controlled environment. Our second study (Chapter 3)
offers a simulated sequential search market environment where sellers can choose
different price and offer strategies (a normal offer or a take-it-or-leave-it offer).
From firms’ perspective, our analysis may provide marketing researchers in-
sights for firms’ optimal marketing strategies. Having a deeper understanding
of consumers’ diversity needs and consumers’ social preference may help firms
improve response rates and avoid inefficient competitions.
3
1.3 Consumer Behavior and Demand Analysis: The Goal
We define consumer behavior broadly. Structural demand analysis usually
starts with assumptions of consumer behavior. From a standard Economics point
of view, most studies assume consumers are rational and their values are con-
sistent with statistical expected values. By specifying sources of uncertainty and
unobserved component (by researchers), we are likely to derive desirable func-
tion forms for estimation in the field. However, consumers may care more than
monetary payoff. It is well documented, in Behavioral Economics literature, that
consumers may be subjected to irrational motivations and bounded rationality.
The broader welfare impacts of those behavioral effects, however, are not well
studied. One difficulty of modeling new behavioral components is that the iden-
tification of those models are not guaranteed due to (other) unobserved factors
including consumer heterogeneity. The goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate
the evidence of two specific behavioral effects and the importance of considering
them in demand estimation and further welfare analysis.
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2. CONSUMERS’ BRANDDIVERSITY SEEKING BEHAVIOR
2.1 Introduction
Consumers may be subjected to satiation effects: after a certain level of con-
sumption, they may tend to switch to other brands or products. If this fact is
significant, brand diversity will have a deeper impact on consumers’ welfare, be-
cause consumers’ choice will not converge to their favorite choice. This paper
focuses on how repeated consumption or exposure will affect brand choice in a
frequently purchased food market (yogurt). The switching behavior in this mar-
ket is not likely to be driven only by variation of price or other product-specific
characteristics, nor can it be well explained by traditional learning models. A
portion of switching behavior may be due to consistent efforts to avoid further
satiation. Is it true that consumers switch due to the ”satiation effects” and search
for diversity? We empirically investigate this question and use structural models
to identify the satiation effects.
There are challenges to study brand satiation. First, satiation is an unobserved
phenomenon. In a general market, consumers’ experiences and consumption are
also difficult to observe and record. Moreover, consumers may avoid satiation
by changing the consumption occasion, consumption time, or consumption order.
By switching within one brand, consumers also achieve consumption diversity.
To identify significant brand satiation, this paper studies a frequently purchased
experience food (Yogurt) market. Yogurt products are treated as a necessary and
healthy nutrition source by many households. Over the past several decades, the
categories of yogurt product have been expanding with more and more flavors
and sub-brands. Although a yogurt product won’t expire until two to three weeks
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after purchases,large numbers of yogurt products are sold in small packages of one,
two or four. In the actual data set we use, a significant number of consumers have
strong back and forth switching patterns among different brands. This research is
motivated by those data patterns.
Another major challenge is the existence of multiple serially correlated un-
observed effects in markets. The previous literature focuses more on whether
consumers have inertia and (if so,) why consumers have inertia. For example, con-
sumers are subjected to significant switching cost and time consuming learning
process. Moreover, in behavioral economics literature and psychology literature,
the power of habit formation has been acknowledged and emphasized. Habit-
ual decision making, rather than conscious decision making, leads to consumers’
“structural state dependence”–even when consumers are relatively experienced
or aware of multiple choice alternatives. Few papers consider how the state de-
pendence term enters into the utility function and why so. Little literature looks
for other possible serially correlated unobservables as the individual data is “con-
taminated” by the inertia behavior.1 With relatively rich reduced form evidence of
diversity seeking, we introduce a model with a behavioral assumption on an indi-
vidual’s satiation point in hope of explaining why consumers switch (frequently)
and to identify the satiation effect).
Finally, heterogeneity needs to be considered: different individuals (house-
holds) may have different preferences; moreover, a given individual’s preference
may change over time (e.g. due to satiation). After using random coefficient
models to flexibly control for cross section heterogeneity, we isolate the within
individual heterogeneity which is due to satiation.
1Large efforts have been spent on distinguishing real and fake inertia, based onHeckman (1981),
without considering other sources of the unwanted serial correlation.
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The topic is interesting and important for both economics and marketing stud-
ies:If a proportion of consumers cares about diversity, then they benefit from a
market with sufficient variety. If consumers’ switching behavior is due to a satia-
tion effect2, then consumers may demonstrate back-and-forth switching behavior.
Consequently, adding diversity will bring additional welfare gains; they will not
only come from the consumers who prefer the new choice, but also from the
rest of the population who don’t like it as much, but can use it to avoid further
satiation. Firms have incentives to use multi-brand strategies with brand-level,
image-based advertising to achieve greater producer surplus while making sure
that consumers are not over-consuming beyond their satiation limit. Therefore,
firms want to better target consumers. From a marketing perspective two impli-
cations are important: first, we conjecture that the effectiveness of advertising is
related to satiation behavior; second, by collecting consumers’ personal purchas-
ing information, profitmaximizingfirms canbetter target consumers and advertise
on new/ substitute brands to those with high probability of being satiated.
Previously (individual level) discrete choice models in consumer behavior
studies explain consumers’ switching behavior as the result of variation in ob-
servable characteristics or an idiosyncratic shock. A popular specification of these
models, in addition, will allow some measures of brand loyalty or other switching
cost based control (e.g. lag choices) to additively enter into the utility function.
The implicit assumptions of this type of setting include: first, Lancaster (1966) the
products or brands under study can be decomposed into pieces of (parallel) char-
acteristics (and consumers are aware of them). Second, although consumers’ types
may vary within the population, an individual’s parameters are stable, indicating
2The paper defines “satiation” in a broad way: it may be due to consumption satiation, brand
image satiation, or excessive exposure to marketing campaigns.
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that consumers’ taste and willingness to pay are stable across time. Third, the
state dependence term is arbitrary: for example, one can just use the choice in the
last period. These assumptions are well founded and easy to implement. How-
ever, the assumptions can be restrictive in many applications. In the nondurable
experience food market, consumers may be significantly affected by the dimin-
ishing marginal utility rule (across periods), leading to a need for diversity over
different periods. Wemainly explore the nonlinear effect of satiation on consumer
purchasing behavior.
To the author’s knowledge, starting from Erdem and Keane (1996), the liter-
ature incorporated a nonlinear product quality signal into utility with Bayesian
learning rules (and a forward looking assumption). The structural model offers
another explanation of consumers’ choice persistence and switching; information
and risk seeking can explain extra switching behavior by the fact that unknown
information (larger posterior variance) may bring utility flow to consumers. The
model can explain frequent switches as tryouts at the beginning of the shopping
trips, especially for those inexperienced brands. However, as those more re-
duced form work, the structural models imply that, in the end, consumers tend to
“converge” to their favorite alternatives when their perception error goes down.
Moreover, this convergence might not be able to explain the switching pattern
among already experienced products/brands. Similar papers involve Ackerberg
(2003), Crawford and Shum (2005), Erdem et al. (2008).
Inmy data from yogurt market, consumers’ purchasing sequences at the brand
level are not converging3. Instead, continued switching back and forth suggests
that other unobservables have significant impacts. Specifically, in the yogurt
market, consumers make choice frequently and consumers have relatively small
3We provide evidence that consumers are brand choosing in data section.
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search costs and a flat learning curve. We observe frequent brand switches and
“switching-back” in this market.A fraction of the switching behaviors cannot be
well explained by conventional reasons, such as a change in relative price, coupons
or in-store advertisement. Meanwhile, these “extra” switching patterns are con-
sistent with a satiation story –consumers switch away because of accumulation
of distaste and they will switch back after the effect “washes out” or “recovers”
(See Figures 2.1,2.2 for intuition; notice that persistent consumers also switch to
outside goods.). However, since the consumers have heterogeneous taste and state
persistence (over time), it is hard to recover the satiation pattern from aggregate
data analysis. In other words, the satiation effect is likely to be a non-constant,
non-random unobservable that varies across time and across individuals.
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Figure 2.1: Switching Pattern for Consumer A
Another strand of research use forward looking behavior to explain consumers’
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Figure 2.2: Switching Pattern for Consumer B
diversity-seeking behaviors. The underlying assumption is that consumers switch
or stop purchasing since the decision to stay with the choice leads to a future disu-
tility. Hartmann (2006) estimates a model with longer lags of previous choices
additively entering into utility function, and calculate the consumers’ recovery
time. Ribeiro (2010) extends it to a differentiated market with frequently chosen
products. In contrast, my paper only makes an assumption about a specific sa-
tiation rule and we avoid making directly assumptions on outside goods which
may be hard to verify. In the yogurt data set we use, the shortening strings of
consecutive brand choice may support a satiation story. (Table 2.1 lists selected
utility specifications for comparison.)
Consumers’ preferences in the market are likely to be heterogeneous. There
is an extensive literature dealing with both cross individual heterogeneity and
positive state dependence effects. Keane (1997) allows not only random coeffi-
10
Table 2.1: Comparison of Utility Specifications
Utility Specification Rationale Paper
Ui jt = Ci j + αiP jt + γ1iI(yi jt−1 = 1) + [γ2iI(yi jt−1 =
yi jt−2 = 1) + ... + γt′iI(yi jt−1 = yi jt−2 = ... = yi jt−t′ =
1)] + i jt
With flexible controls for “heterogeneity”, a positive γ
indicates a “structural” state dependence.
DHR(2010)
Ui jt = Ci j + αiP jt + γi(
∑t−1
τ yi jτ) + i jt Using the summation of previous choices to represent
state dependence effects
DHR(2010)
Ui jt = Ci j + αiP jt + γi
1∑t−1
τ yi jτ+1
+ i jt Allowing a nonlinear curve of previous choices: con-
sumers gradually learn the true brand experience
value
EK(1996)
Ui0t = f (y
t−1
i
, i0t)
Ui jt = Ci j + αiP jt + γ1iI(yi jt−1 = 1) + i jt
Waiting generates more utility after continue purchas-
ing of the same brand (for long time).
R(2011)
Ui jt = Ci j+ f (y
t−1
i j
, γ) ·Si jt−1+αiP jt+i jt, where S is a
satiation function which may take value smaller
than 1 if ”cumulative consumption” is large
When a consumer’s ”cumulative consumption” for
brand j reaches a threshold, she cannot derive the orig-
inal utility.
This paper
1 yt
i
represents history of choices for all brands at each period.
2 yi jt is 1 if household i chooses brand j at period t.
3 Cumulative consumption is defined in Section 2.3
cients over observed attributes and state dependence effects, but a flexible error
term which depends on unobserved attributes as well. Estimation results (using
the method of simulated moments) support a true state dependence. Hierarchi-
cal Bayesian approaches have also been widely used to control for heterogeneity.
Seetharaman et al. (1999) use a Hierarchical Bayesian approach to study state de-
pendence effects. They allow the coefficients to be normally distributed and vary
with household-specific characteristics and category-dependent variables. More-
over, they also define thewear-out effectwhich depends on the time the household
has stayed in a certain brand-category since the last purchase. Sufficient controls
show state dependence effects remain positive within the range of observed peri-
ods. Dub et al. (2010) uses a finite mixture of normal distributions to capture the
cross sectional (non-normal) heterogeneity and obtain similar state dependence
results. Compared with the categories they use, yogurt may be more frequently
purchased and the high switching frequency suggests within individual hetero-
geneity as well. We use a random coefficient model to account for cross sectional
heterogeneity while structurally modeling a satiation effect.
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This paper uses two sets of data. The first data sets are Nielsen data sets from
1986 to 1988. Using the similar data sets, Ackerberg (2001) considers different
advertising effects on one newly introduced product “Yoplait150”. We process
the data at the brand level in order to explore how consumers will switch among
them. In my work, it is also important to provide a relatively precise brand price
index. The data set is not perfect: Ackerbergmentioned themissing price problem
and manufacturer coupon users. There are also other data problems related to my
study: First, each purchasing history is recorded at household level, we assume
household preference is consistent within all members of the household or they
do not shuffle to make purchasing decisions.4 Second, the data set does not have
direct information about availability of the products; we provide evidence to rule
out product availability issue. Moreover, consumption is not observed directly.
The second data sets are IRI data sets from 2001 to 2003. The extra benefit from
the data is that we can control for more product features including store displays
and advertisement. Yet, with expanding products within each brand, the satiation
effects are likely to be weakened. We compare our results in both data sets.
Although we worry less about stockpiling behavior in the yogurt market (due to
storage cost and expiration date), without knowing the exact date of consumption
it is hard to directly conclude that the satiation effect is due to the consumption.
Therefore the work focuses on the switching/satiation effects without arguing
the channel behind. Possible explanations include consumption satiation, image
value satiation, characteristics satiation, etc. We assume households consume
yogurt with relatively smooth speed. The structural model is estimated using
Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) methods.
4We calculate the switching pattern of single member households and half of them involve
switches that may not be explained by price, promotion and advertising.
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We applied MSL methods on a set of linear and nonlinear mixed logit models.
Mixed logit models have been very popular in the literature, mainly due to their
flexibility as well as tractability (with explicit closed form solution). Consider
Brownstone and Train (1998), Calfee et al. (2001), McFadden and Train (2000) for
applications of mixed logit models. Both MSL and Hierarchical Bayesian (HB)
methods have been found to be suitable for random coefficient models (Rossi et al.
(2005), Train (2009)). Similar HB treatment can be found in Athey and Imbens
(2007). MSL methods are more flexible and easier to implement when dealing
with dynamics and nonlinear utility functions; therefore we use it to estimate
the structural model. The gap between the two approaches is shrinking (Revelt
and Train (2000)), for example, both approaches can be used to estimate reliable
individual-level parameters. The choice of two approaches is mostly based on
implementation convenience.
The results of the satiation model shows that all specification reports finite sati-
ation thresholds. In one specification in the ERIM data sets, the satiation threshold
is significantly smaller than 7 consecutive purchases. After controlling for ad-
vertisement and displays, IRI data sets show that the mean satiation threshold is
significantly smaller than 4 consecutive purchases. Based on 100 re-samples of
markets of 127 households using the satiation model and real data, the simulated
market frequency in most markets is closer to that in the real data, compare with
a linear model. The satiation point is robust to changes in function form. We offer
a counter-factual experiment using IRI data set that consumers are subjected to
extra welfare loss after removing 2 brands from the market. Using the IRI data
sets, we include an example of targeting individual consumers. We show that
conditional on an individual household’s previous purchasing history, she prefers
private brands and has a shorter satiation threshold.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the dataset. Section 3
focuses on the structural model and identification. Section 4 provides estimation
results and discussion. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2.2 Data
Twosets ofdatahavebeenused fordescriptive evidence. Bothdata sets consists
of household-level paneldata of supermarketpurchasing records inyogurt section.
The first data sets (ERIM data sets)5 were collected by A.C. Nielsen during 1986
to 1988 in a mid-sized city, Sioux Falls, South Dakota; the second data sets (IRI
data sets,Bronnenberg et al. (2008)) were collected by Information Resources, Inc
during 2001 to 2003 in in Eau Claire, Wisconsin and Pittsfield, Massachusetts. In
this section, wewill use householdswho havemore than 20 shopping trips (within
the three year period) to show their switching behavior. 467 households in the
ERIM data sets and 3081 households in the IRI data sets meet this criterion. In
order to structurally model and estimate consumers’ (weekly) choice decision, 127
households in ERIM (Year 1987) and 181 households in IRI (Year 2003) have been
randomly selected (from the consumerswith high purchasing frequency) andused
in further analysis.
We assume households make brand choice decisions at each shopping trip.
The yogurt markets in the ERIM data sets contain 21 brands in total6 and over
400 sub-brand products. Seven major brands7 in Sioux Falls had taken 97% of the
market share. These major brands come with relatively rich price information,
while we define a composite good which consists of all the rest yogurt products.
5http://research.chicagobooth.edu/marketing/databases/erim/index.aspx
62 other brands have very few entries and thus are omitted.
7YPLT (YOPLAIT),WW (WEIGHTWATCHER), DN (DANNON),NORDICA, QCH,WBB, CTL
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The IRI data sets contain 89 different brands and much more sub-brand products.
We define the market at firm level: 10 major brands 8 and private brands take
96.5% of the total market share, where private brands include all store owned
brands.
The data sets support our assumption: consumers in both data set are likely
to be brand choosing. By looking at consumers’ choices at each shopping trip in
the ERIM data sets, we see that out of 20,881 choice situations, only 1,620 (7.8%)
involve multiple brands in one shopping trip. Themore recent IRI data sets report
higher (14.2%) mixed choices; yet only 1.6% shopping occasions involve more
than 2 different brands. On individual household level, more than half of them
(63.2% for the ERIM data sets and 72.9% for the IRI data sets) have fewer than 2
multiple brands choice within about 3 years and about 93% of the households (in
both data sets) have fewer than 10 choice occasions with multiple brands selected.
Thus consumers not only care about the flavor and ingredient of a yogurt product,
but also it appears that they appreciate the brand experience (texture, special
feature, package, etc.)from each brand and/or they may have different feelings
about the brands due to the company’s advertising, public relation and news
(brand image). Consumers are assumed to be aware of allmajor choice alternatives
at each shopping trip if they are available. For multiple brands in a shopping trip,
we will use the most heavily chosen brand.
The brand price index used in calculation is the store level weekly average
price per six ounces of all major sub-products under that brand given a fixed time.
We achieve the price index information using different methods for different data
sets. For the ERIM data sets, real transaction data has to be used to calculate price
8COLOMBO, BREYERS, DANNON, KEMPS, OLD HOME, STONYFIELD FARM, WELLS
DAIRY, YOFARM and YOPLAIT.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics 1: Sioux Falls
No. Brand Price1 Std. Dev. Min Max Scoupon2 Mcoupon3
1 YPLT 0.57 0.09 0.25 0.69 48 802
2 WW 0.45 0.038 0.29 0.52 1 168
3 DN 0.44 0.071 0.19 0.66 2 278
4 NORDICA 0.38 0.068 0.23 0.5 392 15
5 QCH 0.27 0.043 0.15 0.37 0 0
6 WBB 0.28 0.051 0.14 0.37 0 10
7 CTL 0.26 0.028 0.12 0.5 1 24
8 Others - - - - 0 8
1 Price is average transaction price per 6 ounce of yogurt.
2,3 Scoupon is store coupon and Mcoupon is the recorded manufacturer
coupon.
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics 1: Eau Claire & Pittsfield
Brand Price1 Std. Dev. Min Max Display2 Advertisement3
COLOMBO 0.57 0.103 0.25 0.82 0.36 1.43
BREYERS 0.54 0.105 0.20 0.85 0.22 1.08
DANNON 0.72 0.096 0.29 1.75 0.58 2.40
KEMPS 0.33 0.110 0.09 1.46 0.23 0.48
OLD HOME 0.56 0.059 0.34 1.03 0.71 0.46
STONYFIELD FARM 0.77 0.135 0.30 1.68 0.11 0.95
WELLS DAIRY 0.66 0.132 0.30 1.12 0.33 0.52
YOFARM 0.73 0.136 0.23 1.68 0.63 1.74
YOPLAIT 0.77 0.108 0.28 1.28 0.52 1.88
PRIVATE 0.42 0.080 0.18 1.42 0.42 2.22
1 Price is average transaction price per 6 ounce of yogurt.
2 Display: the average of the total displays (minor or major) each week
3 Advertisement: the average of the total advertisements (including coupons and
large ads) each week
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indices of other alternatives that ahouseholddidnot choose. When there is noprice
information, we approximate the price index using the product in the closest store
and the closest week 9. Store coupons are factored into the price. Table 2.2 provides
summary statistics for the brand price index with coupon information. From the
table, ”Global Brands” including YOPLAIT, WEIGHTWATCHER and DANNON
are with relatively higher price and larger standard deviation. We also notice that
about 14% of YPLT shopping trips, 10% WW, and 8% DN involved manufacturer
coupons and 7% NORDICA purchases involved store coupons. We don’t have
information on the coupon usage for alternatives. Meanwhile, for the IRI data
sets, we have detailed store level data which gives us more accurate information
on prices and other marketing strategies. In addition, the IRI data also contains
information on private brands–the brands owned by stores. However, most brand
contains more sub products, resulting in larger noise in brand price index (Table
2.3). Therefore, both data sets are not perfect. By combining evidence from both
data sets, we hope to provide a more comprehensive view of the diversity seeking
behavior.
Table 2.4 and 2.5 offer a summary of the switching behavior in both data sets.
For example, from the Sioux Falls data set, 8,785 out of 20,881 total shopping
trips involve a purchase that is different from the following brand choice. Yoplait
andWeight Watcher’s products have the lowest switching rate-indicating loyalty-
while local brandswitness higher switching rates. To further investigate the source
of these switches, we consider changes in relative prices and marketing strategies.
We define relative price as the price of a certain brand choice at each period with
respect to the rest brands at the same period. If the choice at period t is different
from the choice at t+ 1, but the relative price of choice at period t is not increasing
9Missing price problem has been also discussed in Ackerberg (2001)
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and the relative price of choice at period t + 1 is not decreasing, then the switch
cannot be explained by price. Similarly, if a brand switch between period t and
period t + 1 is not due to a coupon for the target brand at period t or a coupon for
the original brand at period t, then the switch cannot be explained by coupons.
The sample suggests that even accounting for relative price changes and market-
ing strategy changes, about 10% of the switches remain unexplained. Although
we observe several extremely persistent consumers, the switching behavior is not
rare across most individuals. For each individual, the average number of shop-
ping trips is approximately 45 and average number of switches (Figure 2.3) is
19 (standard error: 0.61). Given that other product characteristics are relatively
stable; this evidence is in favor of a taste variation explanation. Moreover, the
global brands Yoplait, WeightWatcher and Dannon have larger market shares and
lower switching rate, which supports a brand loyalty explanation. However, those
brands seem to have a higher percentage of unexplained switches. To further rule
out the brand switches due to the periodic product availability, we also search for
unexplained switches only among products that are recorded in the dataset during
all the weeks. The results in Table 2.4 show that there are still significant number
of unexplained switches. In the IRI data sets, we have a better measure of adver-
tisement and display: after conditioning on the twomeasure, Table 2.5 shows that,
on average, 8.49% of the switches cannot be explained by observed characteris-
tics. This measure is relatively conservative since it is completely possible that the
switches due to satiation coincide with an advertisement or a promotion period or
the products chosen are not subjected to the change of advertisement or display.
Figure 2.4 shows the individual level switching rate.
The unexplained switches may be attributed to unobserved characteristic,
which is hard to identify even holding all observed characteristics constant. Exam-
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics 2: Sioux Falls
Brand Choice1 Brand Switches2 Unexplained3 Availability4
YPLT 5710 1821 31.89% 214 11.75% 170 9.34%
WW 1565 460 29.39% 73 15.87% 56 12.17%
DN 3505 1442 41.14% 161 11.17% 120 8.32%
NORDICA 3888 1603 41.23% 102 6.36% 79 4.93%
QCH 1220 655 53.69% 21 3.21% 7 1.07%
WBB 1517 968 63.81% 76 7.85% 4 -
CTL 2546 1201 47.17% 75 6.24% 51 4.25%
Others 930 635 68.28% 49 7.72% 21 3.31%
(Total) 20881 8785 42.07% 771 8.78% 508 5.78%
1 ”Choice” describes the market share of the brands
2 A ”Brand Switch” is defined as the number of times consumers switch
away from the certain brand
3 An ”unexplained” switch means both brands are available in store for
both periods and the switch is not due to the following reasons: a,
discount of the target brand; b, price increasing of the original brand;c,
relative price increase. Coupon or advertising conditions are exactly
the same.
4 The availability adjustment is for sub-categories (with only last 3 digits
different in UPC code) that exist in all weeks.
Table 2.5: Summary Statistics 2: Eau Claire & Pittsfield
Choice1 Brand Switches2 Unexplained3,4
COLOMBO 13299 7288 54.80% 533 7.31%
BREYERS 5802 3702 63.81% 337 9.10%
DANNON 32912 14713 44.70% 1228 8.35%
KEMPS 6904 3593 52.04% 291 8.10%
OLD HOME 5538 2781 50.22% 281 10.10%
STONYFIELD FARM 5832 2751 47.17% 239 8.69%
WELLS DAIRY 3474 1404 40.41% 197 14.03%
YOFARM 3503 2100 59.95% 269 12.81%
YOPLAIT 42222 14378 34.05% 1167 8.12%
PRIVATE 10283 5312 51.66% 385 7.25%
(Total) 129769 58022 44.71% 4927 8.49%
1 “Choice” describes the total purchase occasions with the brand
2 A “Brand Switch” is defined as the number of times consumer
switch away from a certain brand
3 An “unexplained” switch means both brands are available in store
for both periods and the switch is not due to the following reasons:
a, discount of the target brand; b, price increasing of the original
brand;c, relative price increase. Coupon or advertising conditions
are exactly the same.
4 1098 out of 3081 households have at least one unexplained switch.
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ples include brand learning, brand satiation or indifference. We provide evidence
that part of the purchasing patternsmay favor a brand satiation explanation. First,
we show that a significant number of consumers tend to consistently switching
around two or three products (frequent switches followed by quick switch-back).
For example, according to Table 2.6 in Sioux Falls, there are in total 2524 im-
mediate switch-backs after one period. More complicated switch back-and-forth
patterns are common to the dataset–especially when considering the fact that the
total number of switches is only 8785. With the results in Table 2.4, it shows that
around 29% of the total switches involve immediate switching back to the orig-
inal brand the consumer purchased previously. Generally, random behavior or
ignorance won’t cause this strong back and forth pattern. For example, without
state dependence, a consumer may be indifferent with two brands: A and B (she
never chooses other brands). With equal probability she will make random draws
from the two. The probability of immediate switch back (“A-B-A” or “B-A-B”) is
25%; withmore choice alternatives or state dependence effects, there may be fewer
immediate switch-backs. This type of switching pattern persists in the sample:
brand learning won’t explain all the data pattern, since they imply convergence
to the favorite choice. For example, still using the Sioux Falls data set, in 1986 the
total switching back-and-forth patterns within three shopping trips is 817 times
and in 1987, the number (for the same set of households) becomes 948. For the IRI
data sets we use, we also observe switch back behavior for each brand (Table 2.7):
the switch back rate is about 27.5% which is also higher than the probability of
flipping an even coin.
Second, we investigate the patterns in purchasing length for individual house-
holds. We count the number of consecutive shopping trips with the same brand
involved andfind that length of consumers’ purchasing string is diminishing given
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Table 2.6: Switch-Back Pattern: Sioux Falls
Brand A?A A??A A ∗ A ∗ A A?A?A?A
YPLT 583 250 202 24
WW 144 65 45 1
DN 412 201 143 7
NORDICA 579 257 218 18
QCH 132 73 36 2
WBB 207 111 70 4
CTL 356 196 128 4
Others 111 83 54 1
(total) 2524 1236 896 61
1 “?” represents any brand not equal to A
2 “∗” indicates any combination of other brands
with length less than 2. e.g. ABABBA orABABA
3 A?A is a row(or string) of choice starting with
A, diverge to other brand for one period, and
return to A again
Table 2.7: Switch-Back Pattern: Eau Claire & Pittsfield
COLOMBO BREYERS DANNON KEMPS OLD HOME
Switches 7288 3702 14713 3593 2781
A?A 1729 533 4390 930 607
A ∗ A ∗ A 770 182 1753 377 228
STYFD FM WELLS DAIRY YOFARM YOPLAIT PRIVATE (Total)
Switches 2751 1404 2100 14378 5312 58022
A?A 607 373 380 5172 1318 16039
A ∗ A ∗ A 222 129 123 1894 484 6162
1 “?” represents any brand not equal to A
2 “∗” indicates any combination of other brands with length less than 2. e.g. ABABBA or
ABABA
3 A?A is a row(or string) of choice starting with A, diverge to other brand for one period,
and return to A again
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an initial long length. Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 illustrate the point using ERIM data
sets. Without considering the heterogeneity, Table 2.8 indicates that: 1. Given a
relatively long initial length, the second length of the string is diminishing; 2.The
longer the initial length is, the stronger the diminishing effect at the first switch-
back. These facts suggest that at least a portion of consumers are not randomly
switching among different brands. The high average initial lengths in columns
one, four and seven are evidence for consumers’ inertia and the quick diminish-
ing of the purchasing length may further suggest diversity-seeking attempts. We
further provide Table 2.9 to show the links between gaps. Table 2.9 indicates an
increasing length of waiting trips before consumers’ switching back to their orig-
inal brand. Learning models may not be able to generate similar patterns (at the
later periods).
When considering heterogeneity, one may not be able to draw quick and clear
conclusion. A state-dependence model with heterogeneity may generate a short-
ening strings as illustrated above. For example, the data pattern may be generated
by eight types of consumers with each type preferring one yogurt brand. How-
ever, a further diminishing in length of second choice strings and third choice
strings in Table 2.8 may be generated by satiation behavior. Moreover, with only
a positive state-dependence coefficient, the data evidence from Table 2.8 and Ta-
ble 2.9 are very difficult to compromise with Table 2.6 which shows that there
are a large number of frequently switching back-and-forth actions for each brand.
Intuitively, for each individual consumer, if one observes both positive state de-
pendence and immediate switch-backs, the possible explanation involves a brand
satiation process.
Table 2.10 provides similar tables in Eau Claire & Pittsfield. On average, the
initial length is even longer compared with ERIM data sets. The fact indicates a
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stronger state dependence effect. However, returning consumers tend to purchase
much less of the same yogurt, suggesting a counter effect may exist to offset the
state dependence behavior. The expanding gaps also suggests that households are
less likely to switch back after relatively large amount of consumption of the same
brand.
Table 2.8: Average Length of Row(string): Sioux Falls
first string length>=2 first string length>=3 first string length>=4
string11 string2 string3 string1 string2 string3 string1 string2 string3
YPLT 4.43 1.89 2.02 6.63 2.70 3.21 8.21 3.93 4.79
WW 6.25 2.43 2.13 8.02 2.83 2.33 11.00 3.72 2.32
DN 4.42 2.26 2.14 6.57 3.01 2.14 9.24 3.64 2.49
NORDICA 3.37 1.33 1.29 4.99 2.05 1.89 6.47 1.80 2.02
QCH 3.63 1.95 1.33 5.28 2.56 1.52 6.00 2.79 1.32
WBB 2.86 1.14 0.98 4.78 1.56 1.56 5.90 2.20 1.90
CTL 3.71 1.57 1.48 5.13 2.01 2.26 6.70 1.98 2.95
Others 3.20 0.89 0.60 4.00 0.80 0.80 5.10 1.10 0.70
1 A “string” indicate a set of consecutive shopping trips with the same brand for each individual.
2 The reason to condition on a long length of initial string, is to create an “initial condition”,
where presumably consumers have a large interest in the brand (or consumers simply have a
larger loyalty value on the brand.)
In sum, there are a significant number of switches and switch-backs that cannot
be explained by observed characteristics. The purchasing pattern suggests that,
in addition to the state dependence effect, consumers may also be subjected to a
negative effect after consecutive within-brand consumption. Admittedly, Some
households in the data are consistent in brand choice. For those consistent house-
hold, although they switch less within yogurt market, some also stop/ switch to
outside good constantly. In the next section, we propose a model with heteroge-
neous types and heterogeneous switching threshold such that the consistent type
consumers can also be captured.
Table 2.9: Average Length of the Gap: Sioux Falls
Average Length Gap expanding?
gap11,2 gap2 gap1<gap2 gap1≤gap2 N
Brand 1 1.28 2.75 30 65 71
Brand 2 1.39 3.28 11 26 28
Brand 3 1.42 2.26 17 51 65
Brand 4 1.48 2.60 24 41 50
Brand 5 1.38 4.10 7 19 21
Brand 6 1.23 4.62 7 12 13
Brand 7 1.57 2.61 20 39 46
Brand 8 1.14 6.71 3 7 7
1 Gap1 represents the number of trips with other brands
between string1 and string2; gap2 is between string2 and
string3. The table is calculated under the condition that
initial length is equal to 3, and it shows that 80% to 90%
percent of time, the gap1 is less or equal than the gap2.
2 We have restricted gap <= 5 weeks. Without this restric-
tion the effects still exist, yet are weakened.
Table 2.10: Average Length of Row(String): Eau Claire & Pittsfield
first string length>=3
String11 String2 String3 Gap12 Gap2 N3
COLOMBO 7.06 2.98 2.94 2.30 3.07 230
BREYERS 6.82 2.25 2.69 3.28 4.42 67
DANNON 6.92 2.84 2.79 2.59 2.73 717
KEMPS 7.21 3.31 2.61 2.42 3.13 149
OLD HOME 7.24 2.84 2.58 2.31 2.77 100
STONYFIELD FARM 7.92 3.54 3.41 2.61 2.96 113
WELLS DAIRY 6.00 3.47 2.84 2.18 2.89 57
YOFARM 6.51 2.49 2.37 2.51 3.93 57
YOPLAIT 7.42 3.44 3.04 2.08 2.77 1049
PRIVATE 7.60 3.58 3.15 2.09 2.60 196
1 A “string” indicate a set of consecutive shopping trips with the same
brand for each individual.
2 A “gap” indicate a set of consecutive shopping trips of other brands
between 2 strings.
3 N represents number of observations.
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2.3 Structural Models of Consumers’ Satiation Effects
According to the descriptive evidence above, we argue that in this market
consumers care about diversity, and thus by forming a structural model of con-
sumer behavior that incorporates this feature, one may be able to revise pric-
ing/advertising policy, predict future switching/market share and conduct welfare
evaluation.
We model the consumers’ distaste effect using a satiation threshold. The con-
sumers are assumed to make a purchasing decision every week; they choose from
available inside goods (major brands and one combination of others in the yogurt
market) and one outside choice. A switch is defined by either a switch to other
yogurt brands or the outside choice. In the data section, the time dimension vari-
able is shopping trip(s); to facilitate accumulation of previous shopping trips, we
use weeks instead. This data structure has been used by Erdem and Keane (1996).
In addition, we also need to assume consumers don’t store yogurt and consume
within each week. This assumption is likely to be true since yogurt products have
a relatively short life and a high storage cost. Households also tend to purchase
yogurt products in small packages.
An individual consumer i’s, during week t, has the following utility specifica-
tion for choice j:
Ui jt = Ci j + αi(wi − P jt) + δi jt + i jt, (2.1)
where wi denotes a consumer’s income; Ci j is a brand dummy for household i and
brand j. P jt is choice j’s price and δi jt represents the experience quality received
by consumer i at week t. In previous literature, state dependence models use the
following δi jt:
δi jt = γi f (y
t−1
i j )
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where γi is the individual-specific state dependence parameter. f (·) is a function
of past choices or states; yi jt is a dummy variable indicating purchases of brand j at
period t (yt
i j
represents the vector {yi j1, yi j2, ..., yi jt}). For example, f (·) can be an index
function with unit value if yi jt−1 is equal to one, or a sum of previous consecutive
choices of the same brand (
∑t−1
τ I(yi jτ = yi jτ+1 = ... = yi jt−1 = 1)). The former
specification suggests that if the choice j is chosen last period, a consumer’s utility
will be shifted by a constant γi. The case of γi > 0 may be viewed as “structural
state dependence”; however, the case γi < 0 may not be well interpreted. The later
specification implies that consecutive purchases generate linearly cumulative state
dependence effects. The more a consumer purchases a certain brand, the more
she is likely to stay in her choice. Learning models assume nonlinear impacts
on a utility function. For example, if one assumes the true experience value of
each brand follows a normal distribution, the f (·) function may have the following
form: f (·) = 1∑t−1
τ yi jτ+1
. When γi < 0, it can be seen that frequent consumption leads
to convergence to the true brand value.
The estimation of the first two models confirms a positive state dependence
effect in the market. However, the models offer little intuition about the negative
draws of the state dependence coefficient γi, nor can they offer explanations for
non-random switching behavior. The nonlinear model allows a decreasing state
dependence effect for consecutive shopping periods. Yet the model contains a
convergence state for each brand where brand preference is stable. We consider
a model to incorporate satiation by assuming consumers have an upper bound
“tolerance” of the brand. If consumers’ cumulative consumption Bi jt on brand
approaches or “hits” the critical value B¯i, she may no longer be able to derive the
original experience value from the brand. The closer the level Bi jt to the upper
bound B¯, the higher the probability that consumers will trigger the switch.
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To keep the analysis simple, cumulative consumption of brand j is defined as
a summation of previous consecutive shopping trips,
Bi jt =
t−1∑
τ
I(yi jτ = yi jτ+1 = ... = yi jt−1 = 1)
This specification implies that as long as a consumer stops shopping for one
period, the satiation effect will go away. Other possible specifications for Bi jt may
incorporate time discounting and purchase quantity. Those specifications usually
require more parameters and creates more nonlinearity. This is especially true for
a discount rate parameter: a higher discount rate and a higher satiation point may
have similar effects so that the identification become less clear. Therefore we focus
on a simple cumulation rule while discussions and an estimation of alternative
models will be provided later.10
Adding a satiation component, the δ function is defined below:
δi jt = γ f (y
t−1
i j ) · s(y
t−1
i j )
f (yt−1i j ) =
t−1∑
τ
I(yi jτ = yi jτ+1 = ... = yi jt−1 = 1)
s(yt−1i j ) =

1 if Bi jt ≤ B¯i + ηi jt
0 if Bi jt > B¯i + ηi jt
γ > 0
10A previous version of the paper consider the following accumulation rule:
(1) Bi jt = λBi jt−1 + yi jt−1
(2) Bi jt = Bi jt−1 + yi jt−1 + ηi jt−1 ...ηi jt ∼N(0,ση)
(3) Bi jt = λBi jt−1 +Qi jt−1 ...Q represents quantity
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E(δi jt) = γ f (y
t−1
i j ) ·Φ((B¯ − Bi jt)/ση) (2.2)
Again f (·) captures state dependence, while the satiation function s(·) takes value
zero or one depending on a consumer’s consumption level. First of all, γ is
interpreted as a positive state dependence parameter and it captures the habitual
reinforcement from each consecutive purchase in the past. γ is a positive value;
alternatively, γ can be drawn from a positive distribution to allow heterogeneity.
Second, a smooth probability function is used to generate satiation effects. If the
cumulative consumption is smaller, the state dependence effects are stronger; in
contrast, if it surpasses the “satiation point”, the state dependence effects may be
small. Third, the positive satiation point B¯i is assumed to vary for each individual.
We assume it follows a log-normal distribution.
As a result, a consumer has to face the following trade-off at each shopping
trip: she may choose to stick to the original choice, however she will have the risk
that the experience quality value reaches her satiation point; alternatively, shemay
choose to switch to her secondary choice–in that case she may be less satisfied if
she would have received larger experience value from the original choice. Her
decisions are likely to depend on her satiation point. If she is with a low satiation
point (less than one), then she cannot derive original utility from a brand after
one purchase. In previous literature, this type of consumers may be captured by
a negative state dependence coefficient.
Themodel allows extra uncertainty (for both consumers and researchers), since
consumer i is not sure about ηi jt at period t. This assumption is plausible because
purchase occasions usually are different from consumption occasions. Whenmak-
ing purchase choices, a consumer has to plan ahead. The assumption is also not the
same as those in forward-looking models; purchases and actions can be viewed as
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two sub-phases within a period. We list the implicit timing rule in Figure 2.5. At
period t−1, individual iwill update her consumption levelBi jt−1 from consumption
and then decide which brand to choose and howmuch she would like to consume
next. At period t, she will consume the products and receive Bi jt according to the
cumulation rule, where the ηi jt is realized. Based on new Bi jt, the consumer will
decide her brand choice and consumption level. The assumption on ηi jt may have
a significant impact on the satiation point, since it determines the shape of the
satiation function. With a normal distribution, we allow the consumption level
Bi jt to surpass the satiation point B¯i.
Figure 2.5: Timing
Period:
update Bi jt−1
brand choice
t − 1 t
consumption and update Bi jt
brand choice given ηt+1
The proposed model allows a probabilistic determination rule which depends
on cumulative consumption and the thresholds. In addition, The model allows
consumers to adjust their experience value according to its position relative to the
satiation point. Figure 2.6 show the expected value of Ci j + δi jt at each cumulative
consumption level conditional on different thresholds B¯ and ση. The solid line
in the figure represents the experience value flow when the base utility C = 5,
incremental rate γ = 0.4, consumption error ση = 1 and satiation point B¯ = 2. The
simulated results consist of an increasing interval and a decreasing interval: the
former part is largely determined by γ and ση; the later part (linearly) depends on
B¯ and nonlinearly depends on ση. The peak of the curve can be interpreted as the
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satiation point (in expectation); this value can be different from B¯, depending on
consumption error ση. A high value of ση delays satiation; however, it also lower
the highest possible experience value.
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Figure 2.6: Simulated Data
The nonlinear model further implies that consumers may achieve the highest
utilityof onebrandbykeepinga constant cumulative consumption level. Speeding
up or slowing down consumption may both have a negative effect on experience
value. Factors that induce unstable consumption may lower consumers’ brand
experience and reduce the probability of staying in a certain brand. A tempo-
rary brand promotion may lead consumers to over-consume, and thus encourage
switching. The structural form also provides a different welfare implication–if sa-
tiation points are low and choices are limited, consumers are likely to be subjected
to welfare loss after quick satiation.
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2.3.1 Estimation of the Threshold Model
A consumer’s expected utility can be written as:
E(Ui jt|θi) = Ci j + E(δi jt|y
t−1
i j ) + αiP jt + i jt (2.3)
where E(δi jt|y
t−1
i j
) is defined in Equation 2.2. Assuming that i jt follows an extreme
value distribution, satiation point B¯i follows a log-normal distribution and all
the random coefficients except satiation point follow normal distributions, the
probability of consumer i purchasing brand j at shopping trip t can be written as:
θ¯ ≡
{
α, {C j} j, ln(B¯)
}
σθ ≡
{
σα, {σC j} j, σln(B¯)
}
θi ∼ N(θ¯, σθ)
P(yi jt = 1|θi, γ) =
∫
exp(E(Ui jt|θi, γ))∑
k exp(E(Uikt|θi, γ))
dF(θi|θ¯i, σθ)
Since themodel has random coefficients, there is no analytical solution. Yet one
can use simulation based methods to integrate out the distribution of the random
coefficients. In practice, we use MSL to estimate the above model. The numerical
integration is over the random coefficients. In practice we use year 1987 data for
estimation. For each iteration, the program will calculate Bi jt and then calculate
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the expected experience value. The simulated probability for person i is:
Pˇ(yi jt = 1|θi, γ) =
exp(E(Ui jt(θ
r
i
, γ)))∑
k exp(E(Uikt(θ
r
i
, γ)))
Pˇ(yi = 1|θi, γ) =
1
R
R∑
r=1
Pˇ(yi1, yi2, ..., yit)
=
1
R
R∑
r=1
∏
t
∑
j=1
I(yi jt = 1)
exp(E(Ui jt(θ
r
i
, γ)))∑
k exp(E(Uikt(θ
r
i
, γ)))
R represents the number of the simulated draws–we use 1000 independent sim-
ulated draws for each of the random parameters and maximize the simulated
log-likelihood function:
SLL =
∑
i
log
R∑
r=1
∏
t
∑
j
(yi jtPˇ(yi jt = 1|θi, γ))
2.3.2 Identification
The model’s key parameters, namely C j, σC j and B¯, need to be identified.
Consumers without switching history won’t help in identifying B¯. However,
consumers who systematically switch back-and-forth(conditional on the promo-
tion and price effects) will help distinguish B¯, since the lower the B¯i is, the more
frequently a consumer will switch. Variation of purchasing length within each
individual will be explained by ση. There is a significant number of switches and
switch-backs in the data set as demonstrated in Section 2.
Ci j is the constant base experience value one can achieve for each period. The
variation in market share will be used to identify mean value of Ci j; The deviation
of Ci j from C j is determined by the difference in share for each individual. αi
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is identified by the asymmetric substitution effect of brand j (i.e. after a price
decrease, the obtained market share is asymmetric and it draws more market
share from the products with similar price.). To see the difference between market
share (which is largely determined by Ci j) and B¯i, consider two choice patterns of
different consumers, “A?A?A?A?...” and “AA??AA??” (“A” may be any brand.);
conditional on constant characteristics, they have the same market share for A,
while the second sequence has a higher B¯. 11
2.4 Estimation Results
We estimate the model using individual household and store level data in 2003
IRI data sets; the working sample is the 25% random draw of the households with
at least 20 shopping trips. 181 individual households are selected in to the sample.
12
We first list the estimation results of linear models in Table 2.11. The house-
holds’ utility function consists of a brand fixed effect, price and marketing effects
and a one-period state dependence effects. All components additively and linearly
enter into the utility function. According to the estimation results, the price coeffi-
cient is negative and significantly (p-value< 0.001) different from zero. Consumers
prefer national brands, especially YOPLAIT and DANNON. The estimated mean
brand fixed effect is significantly better than themean of the outside good (p-value
< 0.001). Moreover, the standard deviation of those two brand fixed effects are
also relatively smaller compared with other brand fixed effects. The parameter γ
implies that if an average consumer purchase a brand last period, her utility will
11Without the satiation parameter, if majority of the consumers follow the first choice
pattern(A?A?A?A?...), the state dependence parameter will be negative, which cannot be well
interpreted.
12In the Appendix, we list a variety of estimations using different data sets or using different
selection rule.
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increase by 0.52 on average. Equivalently, a consumer is indifferent about a 14
cents price increase if she has purchased the item last period.
However the linear models report a large standard deviation for γi even after
we account for other marketing variables. Those negative draws don’t have a
clear interpretation. In the brand satiation model, we interpret this phenomenon
as consumers reaching a threshold. Estimation of the threshold may be informa-
tive: first, it offers a more clear view of the trade-off between state dependence
and satiation effect. For example, previously, researchers were unsure about the
number of periods to be included in the model; with a satiation limit, it is possible
to estimate the time when a state dependence effect will disappear. Second, we are
able to explore a form of within-individual heterogeneity: evenwith similar brand
fixed effects, it is still possible that different households have different switching
behavior and the average shopping trips can be different. Third, it may also have
different welfare implications as well as marketing applications, since the model
implies that the high utility flow cannot sustain forever.
Table 2.12 list the estimation results from satiation models. The mean of most
brand fixed effects are similar compared with those in the linear model–only the
fixed effect of Dannon is not significantly different from 0; the price coefficient
and the effect of other market variables all have similar signs. Consumers’ state
dependence now depends on the δ function which consists of three different
parameters: γi, B¯i and σ. The satiation point B¯i and the inertia effect γi are drawn
from log-normal distributions; therefore, ln(B¯i) and γi follow normal distributions.
A significant positive ln(B¯i) suggests that B¯i is greater than one shopping trips; a
significant negative ln(γi) indicates that γi is between zero and one. According
to the estimated δ function, if a consumer with median satiation threshold (2.23)
purchases a brand last period, in current period the state dependence effect is
35
Table 2.11: Estimation Result 1: Eau Claire & Pittsfield
Linear Model
Brand Fixed Effects Other Coefficents
A sqrt(D) A sqrt(D)
COLOMBO −1.089∗∗∗ 2.359∗∗∗ Price −3.683∗∗∗ 0.056
(0.251) (0.181) (0.279) (0.072)
BREYERS −1.851∗∗∗ 1.705∗∗∗ γ 0.524∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗
(0.235) (0.127) (0.043) (0.075)
DANNON 0.633∗∗ 1.163∗∗∗ Display 1.083∗∗∗ 1.615∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.078) (0.177) (0.157)
KEMPS −3.540∗∗∗ 2.969∗∗∗ AD 0.491∗∗∗ 0.986∗∗∗
(0.423) (0.287) (0.120) (0.113)
OLD HOME −1.203∗∗∗ 1.802∗∗∗ LL 12542.9
(0.305) (0.194)
STONYFIELD −1.020∗∗∗ 1.338∗∗∗ AIC 25145.8
(0.281) (0.104)
WELLS DAIRY −1.263∗∗∗ 2.464∗∗∗ BIC 25241.755
(0.285) (0.200)
YOFARM −3.063∗∗∗ 2.790∗∗∗
(0.372) (0.203)
YOPLAIT 0.817∗∗∗ 1.203∗∗∗
(0.226) (0.063)
PRIVATE −2.166∗∗∗ 2.015∗∗∗
(0.235) (0.120)
OTHERS −2.135∗∗∗ 1.440∗∗∗
(0.273) (0.114)
1 The utility of the outside good is normalized to zero.
0.40. Equivalently, she is willing to take an extra 9 cents and remains her utility
the same as previous period. Similarly, with the satiation threshold B¯ = 3, a
consumer’s statedependence effect after initial purchase is 0.44. The satiation effect
becomes stronger with consecutive purchase: for example, an median household
with mean satiation threshold has an increasing state dependence effect until the
second consecutive purchase. However, the model also indicates that the median
household is likely to be fully satiated after five consecutive trips. Figure 2.7
demonstrate the relation between the experience value of the first five brands and
consecutive shopping trips for a median household in the sample. In addition, we
draw the 90% confidence interval of the whole δ function: the satiation threshold
is bounded between one and three consecutive shopping trips; and the household
is likely to be fully satiated within two to seven consecutive shopping trips.
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Table 2.12: Estimation Result 2: Eau Claire & Pittsfield
NonLinear Model
Brand Fixed Effects Other Coefficients
A sqrt(D) A sqrt(D)
COLOMBO −0.475∗∗∗ 1.898∗∗∗ Price −4.442∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.105) (0.282) (0.073)
BREYERS −1.193∗∗∗ 1.576∗∗∗ ln(γ) −0.800∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.207) (0.097) (0.093) (0.072)
DANNON 1.277∗∗∗ 1.282∗∗∗ ln(B¯) 0.801∗∗∗ 1.114∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.080) (0.137) (0.079)
KEMPS −1.978∗∗∗ 2.279∗∗∗ Display 1.558∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗
(0.236) (0.160) (0.166) (0.051)
OLD HOME −0.728∗∗ 1.447∗∗∗ AD 0.386∗∗ 1.411∗∗∗
(0.262) (0.118) (0.113) (0.086)
STONYFIELD −0.403 1.582∗∗∗ σ 1.003∗
(0.283) (0.117) (0.411)
WELLS DAIRY −1.213∗∗∗ 3.029∗∗∗ LL 12446.500
(0.357) (0.297)
YOFARM −2.318∗∗∗ 2.336∗∗∗ AIC 24959
(0.313) (0.162)
YOPLAIT 1.641∗∗∗ 1.204∗∗∗ BIC 25064.550
(0.228) (0.060)
PRIVATE −1.496∗∗∗ 2.194∗∗∗
(0.204) (0.120)
OTHERS −1.871∗∗∗ 1.752∗∗∗
(0.264) (0.133)
B¯ and γ are assumed to have a log-normal distribution since satia-
tion threshold should be positive.
The utility of the outside good is normalized to zero.
Figure 2.7: Estimated Delta Flow: Eau Claire & Pittsfield
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The nonlinear model assumes that before satiation, consumers are subjected to
state dependence effects such that the more she purchases, the higher her loyalty
will be. However, with a satiation threshold, the consumer (household)maynot be
able to maintain the state dependence forever, this is unlike a linear model which
explains switching behavior by idiosyncratic shocks. The new model allows us to
interpret previously unexplained switches and negative state dependence coeffi-
cients as due to a satiation effect. At certain periods after consecutive purchases
of the same brands, a consumer may be more likely to switch. Compared with the
linear model, the satiation model significantly improves the goodness of fitting in
terms of both AIC and BIC.
2.4.1 Heterogeneity and Individual Household Prediction
To better illustrate that the satiation model can flexibly control for the within-
household heterogeneity and to better illustrate that the satiation model may
predict switching behavior, we plot the parameters of individual households who
have a high number of shopping trips of certain yogurt brand. The method of
individual parameter approximation we use is suggested by Train (2009). One
may calculate the distribution of coefficients given a certain sequence of observed
choices; the conditional distribution will carry more information for each indi-
vidual household and thus can be used to predict behavior of a certain type of
consumers.
First denote hi(θi|y, x, b) the pdf of the individual household who chooses a
sequence of choice y under the observed characteristics x, where b represents the
true hyper parameters that generate the random coefficient distribution. Denote
f (θi|b) the estimated distribution of random coefficient θi. The true distribution of
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θi does not depend on choice results, while h(·) does. According to the Bayes rule,
h(θi|yi, xi, b) =
P(yi|xi, θi) f (θi|b)
P(yi|xi, b)
=
P(yi|xi, θi) f (θi|b)∫
P(yi|xi, θi) f (θi|b)dθi
For individual i, we also can calculate p(yi jT+1|xiT+1, θi), i.e. the probability that
individual chooses brand j next period. By using the consumers’ purchasing
information, we integrate out θi using h(θi|yi, xi, b):
P(yi jT+1|xiT+1, y
T
i , x
T
i , b) =
∫
Pi jT+1(yi jT+1|xiT+1, θi)h(θi|y
T
i , x
T
i , b)dθi
=
∫
Pi jT+1(yi jT+1|xiT+1, θi)P(y
T
i
|xT
i
, θi) f (θi|b)dθi∫
P(yT
i
|xT
i
, θi) f (θi|b)dθi
The above probability can be simulated by taking draws (θr
i
) from the random
coefficients and calculating Pˇ(yiT+1|xi, y
T
i
, θr
i
).
Using an individual purchasing record of 2003 in the IRI data sets and using the
estimation result fromTable 2.12, weplot individual households’ updateddistribu-
tion and compare itwith the sample distribution. In the Figure 2.9 and 2.8, the blue
curves represent sample distribution according to estimation result in previous
section (specification 2 with extra controls). The red curves is from an individual
household’s conditional density function for the brand fixed effect of the private
brand (h(Ci|y
i, xi, θ˜i), where θ˜i is a vector of all parameters except Ci) and the sa-
tiation threshold (h(B¯i|y
i, xi, θ˜i), where θ˜i is a vector of all random coefficients.).
13
Figure 2.8 shows 4 households with the highest number of shopping trips involv-
ing private brands (“C” represents private brands.) in the IRI data sets. Although
the four households all strongly prefer private brands, they show heterogeneous
13We plot the pdf curves within 2 standard deviations of the unconditional mean of each θi.
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Figure 2.8: Individual Households who Purchase Private Brand Frequently
satiation parameters; intuitively the satiation parameters identify their switching
behavior which is unexplained by changes of observable characteristics . Figure
2.9 shows 4 households with high number of shopping trips involving Yoplait
(“C” represents Yoplait.)in the IRI data sets. With a stronger brand fixed effect, the
first household is still subjected to a smaller satiation threshold comparedwith the
sample mean, indicating frequent unexplained switching behavior.
By estimating the satiation threshold, it is possible to predict consumers’
switching behavior at the individual level. As a result, with extra information
on satiation thresholds, firms may be able to adjust promotion and (direct) ad-
vertising strategy accordingly. With firms focusing on brand diversity, consumers
may also benefit from a larger choice set and less irrelevant marketing campaigns.
2.4.2 Diversity Preference and Welfare Implications
We illustrate the welfare implication using a counter-factual experiment. Con-
sider aworldwherewedrop Yoplait from themarket: those consumerswho prefer
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Figure 2.9: Individual Households who Purchase Private Brand Frequently
Yoplait will be affected for sure; in addition, consumers who don’t prefer Yoplait
may also be affected when Yoplait is the second best choice.
We generate 100markets of 181 householdsmaking brand choice over 50weeks
using the satiation model and calculate the total utility (TU0) for the consumers
who don’t prefer Yoplait yogurt most. We have two treatments (TU1 and TU2): in
the first treatment, we drop the brand Yoplait and the households are subjected
to only positive state dependence effects; in the second treatment, after dropping
Yoplait, households make brand choice under the satiation preference. We com-
pare the difference in the change of the total utility between the treatments. In
Figure 2.10, the dashed curve represents a kernel density plot of the change of
the utility (TU1−TU0
TU0
) under only state dependence effects; the solid curve is under
satiation preference (TU2−TU0
TU0
). When Yoplait is removed from the choice set, con-
sumers who prefer other brands instead of Yoplait are significantly affected under
the satiation preference: the mean welfare loss is 3.69%. Yet a conventional state
dependence model suggests little welfare loss. Intuitively, if consumers are likely
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to be satiated, alternative choices are required to “restore” their preference. As a
result, consumers generally benefit from a larger choice set.
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Figure 2.10: Welfare Loss for Households who Prefer Other than Yoplait
2.4.3 Extension and Limitation
The proposed satiation model provides better interpretation (of the negative
state dependence and of the length of history to be included in themodel) and pre-
diction (of a switching probability), compared with a linear model. Meanwhile, it
requires extra assumptions and those assumptions may be weakened or removed
in the future studies. The first assumption is the zero carry-over rate assumption.
According to the model, if a consumer stops purchasing, all her previous history
is forgone. It may be more realistic to allowing a cumulation of discounted con-
sumptions. However, including a discount parameter may cause identification
issues with the satiation threshold, since a high satiation point and a high discount
rate both lead to longer state dependence, even though they change at different
rates. Moreover, different people may have different discounting rate–by using a
universal one, the interpretation of satiation threshold becomes less clear.
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The model also assumes an identical threshold for all available choices. How-
ever, allowing brand specific satiation points also comes with an identification
problem: for each household, usually only a few alternatives will be frequently
purchased. For the rest of the brands, the experience value should remain con-
stant. With a longer period and a larger sample, it is possible to use a selection
function to locate the choices that are frequently chosen and to allow different
satiation points for each of them.
The data sets offer limited information on firms’ marketing strategies. For
example, in the ERIM data sets, complete information on promotions and ad-
vertising displays are available only for the purchased items. For the rest of the
items, the data are recorded only at specific times. In the IRI data sets, although
we have rich information on advertisement and displays. Yet we have to deal
with a much larger choice set, where collapsing on brand/ firm level will create
significant noise. With a more detailed data set and a simple choice structure, it
would be possible to reach a higher credibility and may help investigate future
research topics. For example, it may be possible to look at the effects of satiation
on consumers’ responsiveness to marketing strategies. With a consecutive pur-
chases, the advertising displays become less effective. We observe a decreasing
(positive)correlation between purchasing behavior and advertisement at different
lengths of the cumulative consumption in the ERIM data sets.
Although we focus on demand-side estimation, satiation behavior, also creates
firm-side problems including firms’ optimal pricing behavior and othermarketing
strategies. Those problems are beyond the scope of this paper.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a model where consumers’ switching behaviors
are not only due to the variation of brand characteristics, but due to intertem-
poral brand satiation as well. One possible explanation is that in a frequently
purchasing/non-durable, differentiated good market, consumers’ consumption
has cumulative effects over time: they have high experience value at the be-
ginning state; yet consumers’ satiation effects may dominate state dependence
effects at high cumulative consumption levels; consumers’ loyalty will recover as
consumers switch away to other brands or stop consuming the product. we use
a structural model to test the the hypothesis of satiation preference. Since the
consumption is not observed, we work with shopping trips and specify that con-
sumerswill switch when the cumulative purchasing is close to an upper threshold.
The estimation results suggest that consumers show large heterogeneity in satia-
tion point and after consecutive purchases, an average householdwill be subjected
to a negative satation effect. The simulated market frequency is closer to the real
one than in a linear model. We conclude that some of the consumers in the sample
are subjected to satiation effects.
The satiation model improves upon previous models in the following ways:
first, a satiation model explains negative state dependence effects using a satiation
threshold. Linear models simply treat a negative state dependence coefficient as
a result of heterogeneity; however it is not clear why the previous choices for
certain consumers lead to switching at the next period, given that all other factors
remain the same. In my model, the repurchase probability goes down due to
the threshold. Second, the satiation model suggests a way to treat purchasing
history. For a linear model, a researcher has to debate the choices of lags for the
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state dependence terms. The satiation model allows a nonlinear experience value
curve: the peak of the curve indicates the highest state dependence effect and only
before the peak, the state dependence effect dominates the satiation effect such
that those periods reflect the optimal length of the state dependence lags for each
household.
Third, the proposedmodel can beused to predict households’ switching behav-
ior. Previous models only explain switching using independent random draws.
With assumption in satiation threshold, a household closer to the threshold ismore
likely to switch to alternative choices. This information can be useful in today’s
business practice–since it may improve the effectiveness of marketing strategies.
As a result, the waste of resources may be reduced by better targeting satiated
consumers. Moreover, households’ welfare may be improved if they are provided
with right alternatives when satiated.
Finally, under the assumption of satiation, a more diversified market is pre-
ferred. The model helps explain the expanding categories in differentiated goods
markets, especially the nondurable food market. With a simulation experiment,
We showed that after dropping a brand in the market, the consumers who don’t
prefer those two brands are still subjected to significant welfare loss. This re-
sult may be consistent with the development of the yogurt industry where more
sub-brands and flavors have been provided.
Admittedly, there are alternative ways to model the (inter-temporal) satiation
effects, especially after incorporating more and more market elements and be-
havioral assumptions. With the satiation effects being modeled, firms’ marketing
strategies may be reconsidered andmarket equilibriummay be altered–those facts
may lead to promising research topics and field tests in the future.
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3. BUYERS’ RESPONSE AGAINST EXPLODING OFFERS
3.1 Introduction
An exploding offer is a method that a seller uses to encourage a quick decision
by refusing to sell to a customer unless she buys immediately.The offer strategy
is widely used in a job market where an applicant has to accept or reject an
offer within a very short period of time. Exploding offers have been also seen
in other sequential search markets including apartment renting market, vehicle
selling market, etc. An exploding offer can be written down as a formal offer,
yet it can also be informal and oral. Sellers tend to use this offer type since it
provides a discrimination tool to extract extra surplus from high value consumers.
However, anecdotally exploding offers create inequality contexts with higher price
and limited decision time which may result in not only a low efficient match in
the market, but lower profits as well. The paper focuses on inequality contexts
and explores if inequality aversion will make an exploding offer less effective in
the equilibrium.
Previous studies about exploding offers focus more on matching market espe-
cially in a job search or a recruiting market. In these contexts, an exploding offer is
defined as the offer that requires individuals to respond in a short period of time
before they can search for alternative options. These studies show that exploding
offers lower the matching quality. The result is likely to extend to a more general
market environment with price offers; however, the market phenomenon becomes
less documented. On one hand, the offer can be given in a very informal way 1; on
the other hand, firms don’t have incentive to record or release exploding offer to
1For example, by simply saying “we have another customer interested in the item and will
come tomorrow...” is likely to force a buyer to make a quick decision.
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public. Moreover, those similar markets offer more durable products or long term
services, and receive certain amount of new demand at each period, which makes
information less transparent and traceable at individual consumer level. Those
issues from demand and supply sides may explain why empirical studies with
respect to this topic are relatively sparse. It is not clear how effective an exploding
offer is in a general marketing environment.
In this paper, we adopt experimental methods and use an abstract lab search
market to demonstrate that with rational buyers, sellers tend to choose exploding
offers with higher price; however with human buyers and under the control en-
vironment, the market equilibrium is shifted to lowest price and exploding offer.
We test unobserved behavioral components and provide evidence that 1. buyers
over-reject exploding offers; 2. sellers are less willing to use exploding offers.
These findings are important since previously in a lab search market, we observe
buyers with bounded rationality or risk aversion are less likely to search the mar-
ket, while in our setting, buyers consistently reject and search the second sellers’
offer.
3.2 Literature Review
One strand of recent literature involves using experimental methods to test the
effects of exploding offers in a labor market where the quality of matching is the
research interests. For example, in Niederle and Roth (2009)’s setting, a firm can
hire one applicant and an applicant can choose one firm. Each firm has a fixed
quality which is known to all firms and all applicants whereas the qualities of
applicants are revealed over time. Each of a match firm and applicant’s payoff
depends on the quality of his/her match. They found that markets with exploding
offers, together with binding acceptances create early and dispersed transactions.
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In the same environment, when they restricted subjects to use only open offers,
or to allow applicants to renege on early acceptances, late and thick transactions
were observed. Tang et al. (2009) studied exploding offers by introducing the
Ultimatum Deadline Game. A proposer makes an offer and gives a deadline to a
responder to accept a proposal. If the offer is accepted, the responder gets a payoff
X. A better offer that pays a responder Y > X is uncertain, and the timing of its
arrival is stochastic. Since the conditional probability of the better offer arriving
drops over time, the proposer prefers a short to a long deadline. On the other
hand, if the responder accepts an offer, he sacrifices a more favorable choice when
the deadline is short than when it is long. Proposers in their studies tended to set
too short deadlines, and their offers were frequently rejected.
A more recent paper, Lau et al. (2011) started looking at impact of responders’
other-regarding preference on exploding offers. To be specific, they investigated
hiring situations where a proposer chooses between an exploding or extended
offer. A responder can discover a better alternative offer only if a proposer chooses
an extended offer. If the offer is accepted, the responder can alter the proposer’s
payoff. Many responders in the experiment chose a negative reciprocation after
they accept exploding offers which made a large proportion of proposers with
exploding offers worse off. They argued that participants may have overlooked
negative impact from choosing exploding offers. The paper models labor input as
a reciprocating stage, whilewe are interested in a generalmarketwith endogenous
price.
Another strand of studies propose theories and derive equilibrium conditions
for different selling strategies. Lippman and Mamer (2012) analyzed a market
where a buyer seeks to purchase an asset from a seller who has a finite time T to
sell. In their model, the buyer can be either an exploding or a permanent offer.
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They investigated when the exploding offer is a good strategy to use. However, in
their setting, buyers will choose exploding offers or regular ones and sellers will
decide whether to accept. The valuation is exogenously given by the i.i.d. draws
from a known distribution.
Our paper uses the setting close to the one from Armstrong and Zhou (2012)
where we want to model exploding offers in a general search market. Armstrong
and Zhou (2012) analyzed a market with sequential consumer search where mul-
tiple firms choose whether to use exploding or free recall offers and set prices ac-
cordingly. Moreover, they also investigated a buy-nowdiscount offer (which offers
a lower price for an immediate purchase). They showed, using a game-theoretic
model, that in some cases, firms have an incentive to use these techniques. Using
these strategies reduces the quality of the match between consumers and prod-
ucts since they need to buy more quickly; moreover, these offers also raise market
prices on average. Compared with Armstrong and Zhou, we consider a discrete
strategy, discrete valuation case where the sellers’ game can be viewed as a 6 by
6 normal form game. We focus on equilibrium changes due to potentially both
sides’ non-monetary incentives.
3.3 Analytical Framework
In this section we analyze an experimental search market of two sellers where
buyer visits each of them sequentially in a random order. Each seller sells an item
which has independent value from the same ex ante value distribution for a buyer:
Vi
k
∈ {Vi
1
,Vi
2
, ...,Vi
K
} (where i = 1, 2 represents sellers and k = 1, 2, ...,K represents
possible value) with probability λ1 ≡ prob(V1), λ2 ≡ prob(V2), ..., λ3 ≡ p(VK). The
step of the game is as follows:
1. Each seller sets a price from a possible price range: Pi ∈ {Pi
1
,Pi2, ...,P
i
L} and
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chooses an offer type as either an exploding or a free recall offer.
2. The nature selects which seller the buyer will visit first (S1).2
3. The buyer observes the price of each seller (P1 and P2) and the value of the
item of the first seller he visits (V1
l
).
4. The buyer chooseswhether to accept the first offer or to visit S2. If he3 chooses
to accept, the transaction is occurred and the game is ended; otherwise,
continue to the next step.
5. The buyer visits S2 and observes the value of the item (V2
l
).
6. The buyer chooses whether to accept or reject the offer from S2. If he accepts,
the transaction is occurred and the game is ended. If he rejects and the
first offer was an exploding offer, no transaction is occurred and the game is
ended. If he rejects and the first offer was a free recall offer, continue to the
next step.
7. The buyer chooses whether to accept or reject the offer from S2 (if it is a free
recall offer).
Each player’s payoff is determined after the game is ended. If there is no trans-
action, all players receive zero payoff. If there is a transaction, the buyer receives
a payoff equals to the value of the item he bought, that seller receives a payoff
equals to the price he chose, and the other seller receives zero payoff.
3.3.1 Buyer’s Best Response
Wewill assume from now on that the objective of the buyer is to maximize his
expected payoff. Since an offer type of the second seller has no effect on the buyer
2Let call the first seller S1 and the other seller S2.
3We will assume female sellers and a male buyer.
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strategy, we only need to consider two cases; (1) the first offer is a free recall offer
and (2) the first offer is an exploding offer.
If the first offer is a free recall offer, visiting S2 does not prevent the buyer
from revisiting and accepting the offer from S2, so the buyer will always search.4
After visiting both sellers, the buyer would choose an option that provides him
the highest payoff from three possible options which are accepting the first offer
(V1
k
−P1), accepting the second offer (V2
l
−P2), and rejecting both offers (zero payoff).
If the first offer is an exploding offer, the buyer would compare between the
payoff from accepting the first offer and the expected payoff from rejecting the
offer. The payoff from accepting the first offer is the difference between the value
and the price of the first offer or Π1 = V1
l
− P1 while the expected payoff from
visiting S2 is
5
E(Π2) =
K∑
l=1
λ j
∗max(0,V2l − P
2)
The buyer would accept the first offer if Π1 < E(Π2) and reject otherwise.6
3.3.2 Sellers’ Strategies
In this market, each seller needs to choose a price and an offer type before
knowing whether a buyer would visit her first or not. There are three cases we
need to consider; both sellers use exploding offers, both sellers use free recall
offers, and sellers use different strategies.
4In some cases, it is not neccessary for the buyer to search. For example, if he receives the
highest possible value from the distribution and P1 ≤ P2. In which case, searching provides no
additional benefit for him. However, there is also no harm for him, so we assume for simplicity
that the buyer will always visit the second seller if the first offer was a free recall offer.
5If a value of the item from the second seller is higher than the price, the buyer would accept
the offer and gain V2
l
− P2; however, if V2
l
< P2), he would reject the offer and earn zero payoff. So,
for each value l of the second item, the buyer would earn the greater between 0 and V2
l
− P2. The
expected payoff is calculated from the sum of each of the multiplication of max(0,V2
l
− P2) and its
probability as shown above.
6If Π1 = E(Π2), we assume that the buyer will search with probability 12 .
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First, consider a case where both sellers use exploding offers. Let consider
seller i with a price Pi, who gets matched with seller j with a price P j. There are
two possible situations with equal probability:
1. A buyer visits seller i first. The buyer will accept the offer if the difference be-
tween his valuation of the first item and its price is greater than the expected
payoff from the second offer; i.e., Vi
k
− Pi > E(Π j) =
∑K
l=1 λl
∗max(0,V
j
l
− P j)
and reject otherwise. The probability that he will accept the offer is
Prob(accept i11) =
K∑
k=1
λk
∗Dk
where Dk = 1 if V
i
k
− Pi > E(Π j) and = 0 otherwise.
2. A buyer visits seller j first. Similar to the first case, the buyer will accept
the offer from j with probability
∑K
l=1 pl
∗Cl where Cl = 1 if V
j
l
− P j > E(Πi) =∑K
k=1 λk
∗max(0,Vi
k
− Pi) and = 0 otherwise. If the buyer reject the offer from
j, he will visit i. Upon visiting i, he will accept the offer as long as his value
is above Pi or with probability
∑K
k=1 λk
∗Bk where Bk = 1 if V
i
k
> Pi and = 0
otherwise. So, the probability that the buyer will purchase from seller i is
Prob(accept i12) =(1 −
K∑
l=1
λl
∗Cl)
∗
K∑
k=1
λk
∗Bk
Therefore, seller i’s expected payoff is Pi∗[1
2
Prob(accept i11)+
1
2
Prob(accept
i12)].
Second, consider a case where both sellers use free recall offers. Again, consider
seller i with price Pi who gets matched with seller j with price P j. An order
of visiting has no effect here because a buyer always searches in this scenario.
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Therefore, the buyer will purchase his item as long as (1) Vi
k
− Pi > V
j
l
− P j and (2)
Vi
k
− Pi > 0. A probability that the buyer will purchase from her is
Prob(accept i2) =
K∑
k=1
K∑
l=1
λkλl
∗Akl
where Akl = 1 if V
i
k
−Pi > V
j
l
− P j and Vi
k
− Pi > 0 and = 0 otherwise. Therefore, his
expected payoff is Pi
∗Prob(accept i2).
Last, consider a casewhere one seller uses an exploding offer and another seller
uses a free recall offer. Since an offer type of the second seller has no effect on the
buyer’ strategy, we can use the expected payoffs from the previous cases. If seller
i uses an exploding offer while seller j uses a free recall offer, seller i’s expected
payoff is Pi
∗[1
2
Prob(accept i11)+
1
2
Prob(accept i2)].
7 If seller i uses a free recall offer
while seller j uses an exploding offer, seller i’s expected payoff is Pi
∗[1
2
Prob(accept
i2)+
1
2
Prob(accept i12)].
8
3.3.3 Sequential Search Market in the Lab
We have shown how to calculate payoffs in this game above. For any sets of
values Vi
k
∈ {Vi
1
,Vi
2
, ...,Vi
K
}, probability λ1, ..., λK, and prices P
i ∈ {Pi
1
,Pi
2
, ...,Pi
L
}, we
can calculate payoffs for any combinations of strategies for each seller. Because
we are interested in a case where the Nash Equilibrium is for both sellers to use
exploding offers, we choose parameters for our experimental market as follows:
V ∈ {10, 25, 40, 55, 65, 70}
λ(10) = λ(25) = λ(40) = λ(55) = 0.125 while λ(65) = λ(70) = 0.25
7The case where the buyer visits i first is equivalent to the case where both sellers use exploding
offers and the case where the buyer visits j first is equivalent to the case where both sellers use free
recall offers.
8The case where the buyer visits i first is equivalent to the case where both sellers use free recall
offers and the case where the buyer visits j first is equivalent to the case where both sellers use
exploding offers.
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P ∈ {25, 30, 35}
In this case, there exists a unique equilibrium inwhich both sellers in themarket
choose an exploding offer with the highest price of 35. In this equilibrium, a buyer
would accept the first offer only if his value for the first item is either 65 or 70 and
reject all other values. If the first offer was rejected, the second offer would be
accepted as long as his value for the second item is above 35 (40, 55, 65, 70). All
other combinations of choices cannot be established as Nash Equilibrium and we
provide expected payoffs for all decisions in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: PayoffMatrix
E25 E30 E35 F25 F30 F35
E25 11.91 13.28 13.28 15.04 15.82 16.21
E30 11.72 13.59 15 13.36 17.58 18.52
E35 13.67 13.67 15.86 14.49 15.59 20.51
F25 9.18 12.7 13.48 12.3 15.23 16.41
F30 9.14 10.08 13.83 10.78 14.06 17.34
F35 10.12 10.66 11.76 10.94 12.58 16.41
3.4 Experimental Design
Two treatments were conducted. In the baseline (computer buyers treatment),
human sellers were matched against computer buyers programmed to play an
optimal strategy. In the treatment (human buyers treatment), human sellers were
matched against human buyers. One cohort consisted of eight sellers (for both
treatments) and sixteen buyers (only for human buyers treatment). In each period,
four markets were randomly formed in each cohort. Each market in the baseline
consisted of two sellers and twenty-four computer buyers while each market in
the treatment consisted of two sellers and four human buyers who made six
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independent decisions each. Twenty periods were played in all sessions and the
role of each participant was fixed for the entire session. In the game, half of buyers
visited one seller first and the other half visited the other seller first.
A sequence of values of items were randomly generated andwere the same for
every cohort in every session in both treatments. In addition, we used the same
randommatching in every cohort.9 Using human buyers in the treatment was the
only difference from the baseline.
The insructions were both shown on screen and read aloud to insure the game
was common information among the participants. After the instructions, the
participants answered a quiz, in multiple choices form, to establish that they
understood how to play the game. Each participant needed to answer all questions
correctly before the game started.
Each seller in both treatments got paid based on one randomly selected period.
The earnings were determined by the price chosen in that period multiplied by
the quantity sold and the conversion rate was one point for four cents. Each buyer
in the human buyers treatment got paid based on one random decision in one
random period. The earnings were calculated from the difference between the
value and the price of that particular item purchsed or zero if no purchase was
made. The conversion rate for a buyer was two points for a dollar. In addition, a
five dollar show up fee was added to the total earnings for each participant.
Four cohorts in two sessions in the baseline and three cohorts in the treatment
were conducted. All 104 participants were Texas A&MUniversity undergraduate
students recruited campus wide using ORSEE, see Greiner (2004).
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree, see
9If in one cohort, participant i was matched with participant j in period n; in all other cohorts,
participant i would be matched with participant j in period n as well.
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Fishchbacher (2007). The experiment was conducted in the Economic Research
Laboratory at TexasA&MUniversity, which has 36 networked participant stations,
in April and October 2013. A five dollar show up fee plus their earnings in the
sessionwere paid to the participants in private and in cash. On average participant
earned about $18 for a session that lasted about 80 minutes.
After the decisionmaking portion of the session was completed andwhile they
waited for their earnings to be calculated, participants filled out a questionnaire
which consisted of demographics information, a risk preference test, see Eckel and
Grossman (2008), and a cognitive reflection test, see Frederick (2005).
3.5 Result and Data Analysis
Result 1 Sellers play different strategies against computer and human buyers. Sellers
offer lower prices and choose to use exploding offers less often against human buyers. Both
tendencies persist, if not intensify, over the course of the experiment.
We first compare sellers’ decisions in a computer buyer condition (CB) with
those in a human buyer condition (HB). Table 3.2 provides a summary of all seller
decisions across both treatments. Over all periods, sellers used exploding offers
more often (67.96% in CB vs. 54.58% in HB) and offered lower prices (30.36 in CB
vs. 26.95 in HB). Pooling these values at the subject level and comparing across
condition, a rank sum test confirms that these values are significantly different
(p < 0.035 and p < 0.001, respectively).
Table 3.2 also shows the frequency that each combination of strategy and price
was used over 20 periods. The modal response (32%) in the CB treatment was the
equilibrium strategy, an exploding offer with a price of 35. Less than 5% in the
HB treatment used this strategy. The modal response in the HB treatment was an
exploding offer with a price of 25 (used by 34% of subjects), only about 11% in the
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Table 3.2: Summary Table of Sellers’ Decisions
Buyer
type
Observations
Average
Price
Exploding
Offers
25E 30E 35E 25F 30F 35F
640 30.36 435 71 157 207 110 75 20
computer 100.00% (0.16)1 67.96% 11.09% 24.53% 32.34% 17.19% 11.72% 3.13%
480 26.95 262 165 75 22 164 40 14
human 100.00% (0.14) 54.58% 34.38% 15.62% 4.58% 34.17% 8.33% 2.92%
1 Standard error is given for average price rather than percent value.
CB treatment used this offer.
We can also observe the dynamics of subject decisions. Over the twenty pe-
riods in the experiment, both the sellers in the CB and HB treatments increased
their use of exploding offers (Figure 3.1). The percentage of sellers who used an
exploding offer in the CB is higher than in the HB in most periods. In the last 5
periods, about 76% of sellers in CB session used an exploding offer, while only
about 65% of sellers in HB session used an exploding offer. A joint test of the
period dummy variables suggested that the average exploding offer usage was
significantly different between two treatments (p ≈ 0.010). Yet a linear trend test
showed that the increase rates for both session were similar (p ≈ 0.476).
Selling pricing dynamics are quite different (Figure 3.2). In the first 2 periods,
average prices across condition are nearly identical. After that, they diverge.
While sellers in CB remained at higher price level (if not increased), in HB, they
quickly dropped the price (p-values for linear trend coefficients were 0.176 and
0.000, respectively). In the last 5 periods, seller prices were on average 30.49 in the
CB condition and 26.65 in the HB condition.
Result 2 When given an exploding offer, buyers reject the offer (search for the second
seller’s item) more often than profit-maximizing play dictates. This tendency holds over
all prices and valuations and persists throughout the experiment.
57
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f e
xp
lo
di
ng
 o
ffe
rs
0 5 10 15 20
Period
Computer Buyer Session Human Buyer Session
Percentage of Sellers who use Exploding Offers (by Period)
Figure 3.1: Sellers’ Offers
24
26
28
30
32
Pr
ic
e
0 5 10 15 20
Period
Computer Buyer Session Human Buyer Session
Price Choice (by Period)
Figure 3.2: Sellers’ Prices
58
Table 3.3: Summary Table of Buyers’ Decisions
1st offer is exploding 1st offer is free-recall Overall
Actual
Optimal
play
Actual
Optimal
play
Actual
Optimal
play
Accepts 1st offer,
immediately
1618
51.46%
1860
59.16%
539
20.68%
689
26.43%
2157
37.51%
2549
44.32%
Searches for
2nd offer
1526
48.54%
1284
40.83%
2068
79.32%
19182
73.57%
3594
62.49%
3202
55.68%
Accepts 2nd
offer
1131
35.97%
712(+189)1
22.65%(+6.01%)
1085
41.62%
1018(+241)
28.92%(+9.24%)
2216
38.53%
1730(+430)
30.08%(+7.48%)
Recalls 1st
offer
- -
794
30.46%
536(+243)
20.56%(+9.32%)
794
13.81%
536(+243)
9.32%(+4.23%)
Accepts neither
offer
395
12.56%
383(+189)
12.18%(+6.01%)
189
7.25%
86(+89)
3.30%(3.41%)
676
11.75%
469(+278)
8.15%(4.83%)
Total offers 3144 3144 2607 2607 5751 5751
1 Numbers in the brackets represent indifference conditions for optimal play. The subjects can receive the same net value
or the subjects may receive a best offer with 0 net value. Therefore, we provide a conservative measure and its upper
bound.
2 We assume that consumers search only when the current value is strictly smaller than the difference between the highest
value 70 and the other seller’s price. Therefore, this measure is also a lower bound. There are 498 indifference cases.
Buyers made 6 purchase attempts in each period over 20 periods. Pooling the
results from 3 sessions of 16 buyers each we have a total of 5760 (6 × 20 × 16 × 3)
purchase attempts. Table 3.3 provides summary data on all of these choices.10 In
3144 of these purchase attempts buyers encountered an exploding offer on the first
item they searched. Optimal play (based on price of the items and buyer valuation
of the first item) dictates that buyers should have accepted this first offer in 1860
(59.16%) instances; instead buyers accepted in only 1618 instances (51.46%), a
difference that is statistically significant (p < 0.001). The net result was that buyers
accepted the second offer, the only offer that remained, farmore often than optimal
strategy dictates. Buyers accepted the second offer 1131 (35.97%) times after an
exploding offer, far higher than the 712–901 (22.65–28.66%) times11 they would
10Due to a computer glitch 9 buying attempts were unable to be recorded. These affected four
different buyers over two periods in one session. Given the small number of observations lost
compared to the total number in the sample, we cannot envision how this loss of data would affect
any results.
11This number varies depending onwhether optimal buyerswould have bought the second item
if the net gain from doing so was zero (when value=price).
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have if they followed optimal strategy. The calculated loss of such deviation is
about 1.08 per item, a value that is significantly different from 0 (p < 0.001).
It should be noted that buyers also displayed a tendency to search for a second
offer more often than “optimal” with free-recall offers, though these cases are very
different than with exploding offers. In general, buyers with a free-recall offer
should search for the second offer unless they get the highest value at a price
less than or equal to the second offer. In those cases, it is unnecessary for buyers
to search—the first offer is optimal—but searching produces no economic loss as
buyers may recall their first offer. Buyers with free-recall offers ultimately chose
the right item—the one with the highest net gain—86.74% of the time.12
The tendency for buyers to turn down exploding offersmore often than optimal
playwasnot isolated to a specific valuation or seller price pair. Figure 3.3 illustrates
optimal response (dashed line) and actual response (solid line) in terms of rejection
rate for buyers over different valuations for the first item when the seller uses
an exploding offer. For instance when a buyer has a value higher than 55, in
most instances optimal play would be to accept the offer. In the experiment,
however, buyers showed a significant amount of rejection under these high values.
Separating the data by seller-price pairs (i.e., the price the first sellermakeswith an
exploding offer and the price the second seller offers), the over-rejection patterns
remain under all price pairs (Figure 3.4).
Buyers persistently over-rejected exploding offers over the course of the exper-
iment. Figure 3.5 plots the rejection rate from optimal play and buyer rejection
rate. In every period, the actual rejection rate is greater than or equal to the rate
predicted by optimal play. Both a parametric t-test and non-parametric rank sum
12In the remainder of these choices buyers mistakenly chose the item they valuedmost, ignoring
price, rather than focusing on net gain.
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test, collapsed to subject, suggest the rejection rate with human buyers is higher
than optimal (p < 0.001).
Result 3 Because of their increased propensity to reject exploding offers, human buyers
present different incentives to sellers than computers following optimal strategy. In
addition to the standard equilibrium found when buyers play the theoretically optimal
strategy, the sellers’ pricing game with the payoffs created by human buyers contains
a second equilibrium where sellers both make exploding offers at the lowest price. The
quantal response equilibrium shows this second equilibrium is the convergent equilibrium.
Result 2 demonstrates that human buyers act significantly different than com-
puter buyers programmed to follow optimal play. As one might expect, this
presents different expected payoffs for the two sellers depending on whether they
face human or computer buyers. Table 3.4 presents a comparison of payoffs de-
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pending on whether the two sellers in the game face human or computer buyers.
The human buyer payoffs are constructed using the buyer choice distributions in
our sample. They capture the fact that an average buyer will over-reject exploding
offers. Payoffvalues are determinedbya simulationwhere 20,000 “human”buyers
receive the offers of two sellers in random order. The payoffs for strategies that in-
volve exploding offers are generally lower with human buyers than the theoretical
prediction. This difference creates a second, pure-strategy, symmetric equilibrium
where both players offer the lowest price as an exploding offer ((25,E), (25,E))
in addition to the pure-strategy, symmetric equilibrium of both players playing
the highest price with an exploding offer ((35,E), (35,E)). The latter strategy pair
is the only pure-strategy, symmetric equilibrium that exists in theory or against
computers buyers who play the theoretically optimal strategy.
There are two points about the gamewith simulated human buyers that require
more explanation. First, it is difficult to understand the intuition that buyers
rejecting exploding offers more often than optimal leads to the creation of a new
equilibrium where exploding offers will still be used. To consider this possibility,
note that if sellers pick equal priceswith different types of offers, the seller with the
exploding offer does much better. However, lowering prices against an exploding
offer can lead to higher payoffs in some cases. Sellers may find it effective to offer
an exploding offer with a lower price to ”pay” the reluctant buyer to accept an
exploding offer.
Second, the existence of two pure-strategy, symmetric equilibria brings up the
issue of equilibrium selection. It is desirable to be able to focus on one equilibrium
and there are many techniques to do so. One popular technique, the quantal
responsemodel (QRE) (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)), shows that the lower priced
equilibrium ((25,E), (25,E)) is the “convergent equilibrium.”
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Table 3.4: Simulated PayoffMatrix
Theoretical
25, E 11.909 13.271 13.271 13.674 15.059 15.641
30, E 11.721 13.563 14.949 12.887 16.409 18.071
35, E 13.675 13.675 15.824 14.200 15.035 19.143
25, F 10.016 12.740 13.309 11.781 14.528 15.679
30, F 9.650 11.291 14.312 10.816 14.137 17.434
35, F 10.486 11.258 13.173 11.012 12.618 16.493
Simulated Human Buyers1
25, E 30, E 35, E 25, F 30, F 35, F
25, E 11.730 13.694 14.901 12.571 14.647 15.595
30, E 10.880 13.105 14.401 11.759 14.475 16.601
35, E 10.812 13.566 15.513 11.510 13.624 17.839
25, F 10.940 13.575 14.985 11.781 14.528 15.679
30, F 9.937 12.767 15.234 10.816 14.137 17.434
35, F 10.313 12.561 14.167 11.012 12.618 16.493
1 The ”human buyer” payoff matrix is calculated like the theoret-
ically optimal matrix, except that the observed rejection rate of
exploding offers is used rather than the theoretical optimum.
To model the quantal response equilibrium, we define the expected payoff of
using strategy si when playing with computer buyers as:
ui(si) = λ

∑
−i
u (si, s−i)pi−i (s−i)
 + si , (3.1)
where u(si, s−i) represents the expected payoffwhen the seller uses si and the other
seller uses s−i. We assume that ’s follow type-1 extreme value distributions.
Letting σi(ui, u−i) = probi(ui, u−i), a quantal response equilibrium for the game with
both sellers is any pi ∈ ∆ such that
pii(si) = σi (ui (pi−i (s−i)) , u−i (pii (si))) , for i,−i and all s.
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Figure 3.6: QRE in HB and CB sessions with different λ
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(b) HB sessions
Figure 3.6 illustrates the prevalence of different seller strategies under the
quantal response equilibrium model in the human and computer buyer sessions.
The payoffs given in table 3.4 are directly used as sellers’ payoffs for playing
different strategies. In the computer session, exploding offers lead to consistently
better payoffs than free-recall offers given the computer buyers’ optimized play. In
the human session, however, buyers consistently over-rejected exploding offers.
Modifying seller payoffs to account for this over-rejection creates a new game, one
where both sellers making an exploding offer with price 25 becomes an additional
NashEquilibrium. Figure 3.6(b) shows that theQREmodel selects this equilibrium
as the convergent equilibrium.
Result 4 In both conditions, sellers demonstrate a reluctance to play strategies that in-
volve the use of exploding offers. The tendency persists against human buyers, but
dissipates against computer buyers who play optimal strategy. This analysis controls
for the differential expected payoffs of both strategies in the human and computer buying
session.
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The quantal response model provides a baseline utility framework for sellers
(see equation 3.1). In order to determine whether sellers have any preferences
toward exploding offers not captured in themodel, we introduce a new term δ that
is included in sellers’ utility only if they make an exploding offer. If δ is negative
(positive), than sellers are reluctant (overeager) to use exploding offers; they derive
additional negative (positive) utility from making them. If δ is zero, sellers do not
have a systematic bias in their use of exploding offers. As the use of exploding
offers varies between sessions and also within session by period (see Figure 3.1),
we introduce four terms to capture the dynamics and session effects of exploding
offers. The terms δH0, δHT represent the delta term in the first and last periods of the
human buyer session, respectively; the terms δC0, and δCT represent the delta term
in the first and last periods of the computer buyer session, respectively. All other
periods are convex combinations of their respective sessions’ two terms. Similar
terms are constructed for λ in the QRE model: λH0, λHT, λC0, and λCT. Equation
(3.2) provides this utility model for subject i in period t.
uit (sit) =
(
20 − p
19
uX0 (sit) +
p − 1
19
uXT (sit)
)
(3.2)
X ∈ {C,H} represents two treatments.
where
uC0 (sit) = λC0

∑
−i
uˆ (sit, s−i)pi−i (s−i) + δCOI(exploding offer)

uCT (sit) = λCT

∑
−i
uˆ (sit, s−i)pi−i (s−i) + δCTI(exploding offer)

uH0 (sit) = λH0

∑
−i
uˆ (sit, s−i)pi−i (s−i) + δH0I(exploding offer)

uHT (sit) = λHT

∑
−i
uˆ (sit, s−i)pi−i (s−i) + δHTI(exploding offer)

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Table 3.5: Estimation Result
Computer Session Human Session
λX0 0.964
∗∗∗ 1.427∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.205)
λXT 0.748
∗∗∗ 3.272∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.212)
δX0 −2.017
∗∗∗ −1.106∗∗∗
(0.202) (0.232)
δXT −0.595 −1.442
∗∗∗
(0.308) (0.269)
LL -1036.710 -710.265
1 X ∈ {C,H} represents computer buyer treatment
or human buyer treatment.
Table 3.5 provides parameter estimates for this model. Initially, in both the
human and computer conditions sellers were reluctant to use exploding offers.
Both coefficients, δCO and δHO, are significantly less than 0 (p < 0.001). By period
20, however, sellers’ reluctance to use exploding offers on human buyers persists
(δHT is significantly less than 0, p < 0.001), but sellers show no reluctance to use
exploding offers on computer buyers (δCT is not significantly less than 0, p ≈ 0.054).
The terms of this ”exploding offer aversion” are economically significant. Literally
interpreting the coefficients suggests that sellers experiencedadisutility equivalent
to $1.10–$1.40 in possible earnings the use of exploding offers against human
buyers.13 Full analysis of both buyer and seller earning are found in the next
result.
The λ term in the human-buyer condition is generally greater than the cor-
responding term in the computer-buyer condition. An F-test rejects the joint
hypothesis of both λCO = λHO and λCO = λHO (p < 0.001). Further, the estimate
13This is a tricky point. Sellers are only paid based on one round of twenty so no one decision to
avoid an exploding offer has an expected cost of $1.10–$1.40. However, the pattern of behavior of
continually avoiding exploding offers does cost sellers losses of this magnitude.
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of λ increases in the human buyer session over the 20 periods (δH0 is significantly
greater than δHT, p < 0.001), but if anything the estimate decreases in the com-
puter buyer session. The λ is usually interpreted as the “noisiness” parameter in
a QRE model; our estimation results indicate that sellers play more “accurately”
with human buyers. This may be due to two facts. First, we used empirical play
information in the estimation. The empirical play is determined by seller-buyer
interactions. Second, sellers may face less payoff uncertainty when playing with
human buyers, given that they rejected high price offers or exploding offers with
higher probability.
Result 5 Sellers in the human-buyer condition earn less than sellers in the computer-
buyer condition. Human buyers are better off compared with computer buyers in the
computer session. The aggregate surplus of the human session is significantly lower than
that of the computer session.
Result 5 shows the primary difference between human buyers and the optimal
play, utilized by computer buyers, is the human buyers’ increased tendency to
reject explodingoffers. This difference inplay leads to great differences in earnings.
Sellers earn more on average each period with computer buyers ($12.94) than
human buyers ($11.47). Both a parametric t-test and non-parametric rank sum
test, collapsed to subject level, confirm sellers earn more in the computer buyer
session (p < 0.001 for both tests). Human buyers earn significantly less on average
than optimal strategy given sellers’ choice ($16.254 vs. $16.794, p < 0.001 for both
tests). Meanwhile, human buyers’ earnings are significantly improved compared
with computer buyers ($16.254 vs. $15.224, p < 0.001 for both tests). These results
cannot be due to different realizations of buyer valuations; both computer buyers
and human buyers received exactly the same draws of a random distribution of
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Figure 3.7: Profit Comparison
valuations.
Figures 3.7(a) and (b)—which show the average earnings of sellers and buy-
ers, respectively, in each condition, over the twenty periods of the experiment—
demonstrate these differences in payoffs persist. There is evidence to suggest the
difference between seller earnings in human- and computer-buyer conditions is
actually increasing over the course of the experiment. Between the two conditions,
the average difference in seller earnings is $1.172 in periods 1–10; the average dif-
ference in seller earnings is $1.771 in periods 11–20. A difference-in-difference re-
gression reveals this result is significant ($0.60, p < 0.001). Similarly, buyers’ profit
difference on average is $1.582 and it is increasing over time (p = 0.002). There is
also a downward trend in the average profit for computer buyers (p = 0.029). 14
The aggregate market surplus for both buyers and sellers is higher for the
computer buyer treatment. Both t-test(p = 0.019) and rank-sum test (z = 0.011) at
group level show the difference is statistical significant. In monetary value, the
average difference is $0.44–or 1.6% of the average surplus each period.
14The earnings for computer buyers were not recorded at individual level; the difference is
significant at group level.
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3.6 Conclusion
Charness and Rabin (2002) concludes that subjects may be motivated by reci-
procity in addition to distributive differences in their payoff functions. We are
interested in the performance of exploding offer strategies in a search market. In
this setting, from both sellers’ side and buyers’ side, an exploding offer can be
viewed as an intention based device. Since buyers observe sellers’ conducts be-
fore making choices, an exploding offer may signal negative intention and lead
buyers to negatively reciprocate that even they can be better off without rejecting
an exploding offer. For the seller side, sellers simultaneously move in the market,
and they may expect that exploding offers may trigger more intense competition.
The experiment results support our conjecture.
In our experiment, theorypredicts thatwith onlymonetary incentives, the equi-
librium involves sellers using highest price and exploding offers. Yet controlled
experiments with human buyers deviate from this prediction. In the human buyer
session, we find evidence that buyers systematically over-reject exploding offers.
This fact confirms a negative reciprocity story: buyers choose to deviate from their
best response due to the sellers’ aggressive strategy choices. On the other hand,
sellers hesitated to use exploding offer as competing tools even when exploding
offers are optimal.
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4. CONCLUSION
In the previous two sections, we demonstrate that without considering the
additional behavioral effects, our market/ demand analysis can be different, which
leads to distinct policy implications. The findings or models may have potentials
to be applied in the field. For example, the model of brand satiation may help
firms’ direct marketing programs by providing information on consumers who
are more likely (andmore willing) to switch. The experiments on exploding offers
may provide information for policy makers to evaluate the welfare change or
at least motivate more investigations in the field. Our papers may also provide
insights for theory development. For example, Optimal pricing under diversified
preference can be an important research topic.
Our analysis relies on detailed individual level data sets aswell as experimental
designs. With individual level data sets, we may not only test the core behavioral
assumptions of theories, but also build empirical models based on individual
behavioral patterns. However, detaileddata sets are not panaceas for identification
problems. It is possible that consumers’ choices are subjected to other unobserved
factors. We remain cautious about our conclusions: our source of identification
primly comes from consumers’ unexplained back-and-forth switches. We define
“brand satiation” as a phenomenon rather than a mechanism. With appropriate
experimental designs, we achieve higher credibility by controlling for observed
characteristics and by randomizing over unobserved characteristics. We interpret
the “exploding offer aversion” as a fundamental preference component that is
likely to be held in the field.
Similar approaches can be applied to other individual markets to investigate
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unexplainedmarket phenomenons and test existing theories, especiallywith better
data collecting technologies and experimental tools. We think those empirical
studies can contribute to both real world applications and theory developments.
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APPENDIX A
CONSUMERS’ BRAND DIVERSITY SEEKING BEHAVIOR
A.1 Brand Price Issue of ERIM Yogurt Data Sets
A.1.1 Introduction
Price information for each product is not perfect. First of all, only transaction
price is recorded. Second, each brand may have certain number of sub-brands,
and the sub-brands may not be in the market for all 3-year-period. Third, at store
level, we don’t have products availability information. Also, coupon should be
considered.
We want to capture the brand value using a brand price index. The simplest
way is to just calculate weekly average price for all the products within that brand,
weighted by the sample size at store level. In this case all individual in the dataset
will face the same brand price at the same week. The estimation results with
this specification have large negative log likelihood value. A more elaborated
approach is to search for weekly store level price; the approach was used in the
application part of Athey&Imbens(2007). Moreover, they treat missing value as
due to the availability issue.
A.1.2 Process Price Information in the ERIM Data Sets
For the potential concerns on price, we offer some more data evidence for your
consideration. Table A.1 sum up the store level weighted average price for all
purchasing records within that brands, the problem is that the price variation may
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be only due to the change of market share of certain products (i.e. some low price
products leave the market). To rule out the possibility, we list the possible brand
categories within a brand with their frequency and average price in Table A.2 and
A.3. By category, wemean a group of products thatmay have similar price. We can
see that major brands like Yoplait and Dannon tend to have more sub-categories
or sub-brands. Some of those sub-categories did not last for the whole 3 years of
the dataset, some of them are newly introduced in the middle of the dataset. To
avoid the effect of those products in calculating store level average price, we drop
that price information (plus they tend to have much lower purchasing frequency).
In addition, the average price may be problematic if we don’t consider the
store effects. For some stores the average prices tend to be relatively stable,
while the aggregate average price tends to be increasing in the 3 years(with or
without consideration of the brand category variation). So we calculate the store
level average price using information from main brand categories. Figure A.1
demonstrates the price trend using Yoplait.
Table A.1: Average Price for each
Brands (obs:59201)
1986 1987 1988
brand1 0.5198 0.5478 0.5710
brand2 0.4118 0.4364 0.4507
brand3 0.4145 0.4323 0.4467
brand4 0.3936 0.3271 0.3397
brand5 0.2682 0.2765 0.2759
brand6 0.3398 0.2703 0.2809
brand7 0.2625 0.2562 0.2775
brand8 0.3211 0.3402 0.3492
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Table A.2: Information of Brand Sub-categories: ERIM Data Sets
Index Brand Possible Sub-category
1 YPLT YPLT FOB, YPLT BKFST, YPLT 150, YPLT Y-C DST, YPLT ORIGINAL, YPLT CUSTARD
2 WW WWNF
3 DN DN FF MP , DN FRSH FLVR, DN HRTY N&R, DN , DN SP, DN XS
4 NORDICA NORDICA, NORDICA SW, NORDICA LF FOB
5 QCH QCH, QCH LF, QCH SW
6 WBB WBB
7 CTL CTL BR/LF, CTL BR BKFST, CTL BR EURO
Table A.3: Information of Brand Sub-categories 2: ERIM data sets
1.YPLT Subbrand Freq mean price St.d note
1 ORIG 8,003 0.607 0.003
2 FOB 438 0.531 0.001 1st yr
3 CUSTARD 3,079 0.303 0.003
4 Y-C DST 612 0.543 0.002 1st, 2nd yr
5 BKFST 422 0.674 0.006 1st yr
6 150 880 0.624 0.005 2nd, 3rd yr
3.DN
1 DN/DNMP 6,876 0.429 0.001
3 FRSH FLVR 867 0.417 0.003
4 HRTY N&R 5 0.503 0.008
5 SP 34 0.512 0.020 1st yr
6 XS 255 0.508 0.006 1st yr,few 2nd
4.NORDICA
1 None 260 0.246 0.003 2nd, 3rd yr
2 SW 7949 0.342 0.001
3 LF FOB 5786 0.344 0.001
5.Q CH
1 None 1,560 0.276 0.001
2 QCH LF 2,346 0.266 0.001
3 QCH SW 134 0.277 0.004
7. CTL BR
1 None/LF 7,441 0.263 0.000
2 N SW 88 0.309 0.004 mostly 1988
1 The periods of records are listed in the note column.
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A.2 Brand Price Issue of IRI Yogurt data sets
In the IRI data sets, we have a larger sub-brand category for each brand and
a better definition of the sub-brand. IRI data sets uses a 5-level1 measure to
categorize each product. Our choicemodel is built on level 4which is the “vendor”
level. Table A.4 shows the relationship between “vendor” and “brand”. In our
paper, we group similar brands under the same vendor and we refer each specific
brand as a sub-brand to that vendor. Comparing with ERIM data sets (in which,
we used a similar but a heuristic way to distinguish among sub-brands.), we can
see that the sub-brand categories have expanded significantly.
Table A.4: Information of Brand Sub-categories: IRI Data Sets
Brand Subbrand Share Brand Subbrand Share
1. COLOMBO 5. OLD HOME
COLOMBO 2.830 OLD HOME 30.190
COLOMBO CLASSIC 49.740 OLD HOME 100 CALORIE 31.550
COLOMBO LIGHT 47.430 OLD HOME FOR KIDS 8.910
2. BREYERS OLD HOME GAYMONT 24.290
BREYERS 54.720 OLD HOME SHAKERS 0.700
BREYERS CRME SAVERS 25.810 OLD HOME SMOOTHIE 0.610
BREYERS FRUIT PARFAIT 0.780 OLD HOME VELVET DELIGHT 3.740
BREYERS LIGHT 11.240 6. STONYFIELD FARM
BREYERS LIGHT N LIVELY 2.240 STONYFIELD FARM 78.940
BREYERS SMOOTH AND CREAMY 5.210 STONYFIELD FARM KIDS 2.330
3. DANNON STONYFIELD FARMORGANIC 4.260
DANNON 19.070 STONYFIELD FARMOSOY 1.650
DANNON CREAMY FRUIT BLENDS 4.710 STONYFIELD FARM PLANET PROTEC 2.240
DANNON DANIMALS 3.820 STONYFIELD FARM SQUEEZERS 3.710
DANNON DANIMALS DRINKABLE 5.150 STONYFIELD FARM YOBABY 5.400
DANNON DOUBLE DELIGHTS 0.370 STONYFIELD FARM YOSELF 1.480
DANNON FAT FREE 1.780 7. WELLS BLUE BNNY
DANNON FRUIT ON THE BOTTOM 6.470 WELLS BLUE BNNY DISNY SWRLNM 0.720
DANNON FRUSION 0.880 WELLS BLUE BNNY DISNY YO-PA 0.320
DANNON LA CRME 5.560 WELLS BLUE BNNY LITE 85 98.950
DANNON LA CRMEMOUSSE 0.550 9. YOPLAIT
DANNON LIGHT N FIT 40.410 YOPLAIT EXPRESSE 1.190
DANNON LIGHT N FIT CREAMY 5.480 YOPLAIT GO GURT 6.220
DANNON LIGHT N FIT SMOOTHIE 0.450 YOPLAIT GRANDE 0.070
DANNONNATURAL 0.300 YOPLAIT KIDS 0.710
DANNONNATURAL FLAVORS 1.290 YOPLAIT LIGHT 20.530
DANNON PREMIUM 0.220 YOPLAIT NOURICHE 1.330
DANNON SPRINKLINS 1.190 YOPLAIT ORIGINAL 37.710
DANNONWHIPPED 2.320 YOPLAIT THICK AND CREAMY 14.570
4. KEMPS YOPLAIT TRIX 6.150
KEMPS CLASSIC 17.880 YOPLAIT WHIPS 11.070
KEMPS FREE 29.840 YOPLAIT YUMSTERS 0.460
KEMPS NONFAT 100 CALORIES 29.990
KEMPS SPOONZ N YOGURT 0.510
KEMPS YO J 8.740
KEMPS YO STIX 4.180
KEMPS YOGURT JRS 8.860
1Large category(Yogurt), small category (Yogurt/Yogurt drinks), parent company, vendor, brand
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A.3 Brand Experience
Most of the consumers are experiencedwithmultiple brands. In figure A.3 and
A.4, we show the histogram of consumers’ experience within yogurt market. The
horizontal axis represents the number of brands that consumers have attempted
(at least twice) during the 3 years. More than 50% of the consumers involve pur-
chasing 3 or 4 brands. The high level of brand experience combined with the
unexplained switches in the market may suggest that, instead of learning effects,
diversity seeking behavior also exists in the market.
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Figure A.3: Consumers’ Experience: Sioux Falls
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APPENDIX B
SOCIAL PREFERENCE AND BUYERS’ RESPONSE
B.1 Instructions Used in the Experiment
We provide here the instructions used in the 2 treatments, a treatment with
computer buyers and a treatment with human buyers. The instructions were both
read aloud and seen from the screen. After the instructions, participants were
required to answer some questions to ensure that they understood how to play
the game.
B.1.1 Sessions with Computer Buyers
Instructions
Today, you will be participating in an economics experiment. The experiment
tests how people make decisions involving money. The decisions you make in
this experiment will determine your earnings, which will be converted to cash
and paid at the end of this session. You will make all of these decisions on the
computer in front of you. Please pay attention to these instructions so you will
understand how to make money.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand, and the experimenter will
quietly answer your question. Please do not talk to any other person during this
experiment.
Each of you will be randomly assigned into a group of two participants in each
period. You will be a ”seller” in a market of 2 ”sellers”. There are 24 ”computer
buyers” in the market and they will visit the sellers in the market sequentially. (A
computer buyer is a piece of computer code which tries to maximize its expected
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payoff from purchasing items from the sellers). As a seller, you are endowed with
supply of items and will choose a price and an offer type (will explain later) for all
”computer buyers”. Each seller has enough items to sell to every buyer and the
production cost is 0. ”Computer buyers” will randomly encounter a seller’s item
and choose to buy that item or search to examine the other seller’s item. They
have zero search cost. Depending on the terms of the first seller’s offer, examining
the second seller’s item may cause the first seller’s offer to be no longer available.
The stage of a game
You are a seller in a market of 2 sellers and 24 ”computer buyers”. Each of the
computer buyers can purchase at most 1 unit in each period.
You and the other seller will choose to set a price which can be 25, 30 or 35.
Along with setting the price, you can also choose one of two offer types. A price
and an offer type will be the same for all buyers in the market. These offer types
will be explained on the next page.
Each sellerwill earn points equal to the pricemultiplied by the number of items
the buyers buy from you.
Each of the buyers has specific, randomly determined, point values for each
seller’s item. This value is randomly determined from a distribution that will be
explained in more detail later.
If a buyer buys an item, she will earn points equal to her point value for that
item minus the item’s price.
Each computer buyer will immediately learn the prices and the offer types of
both sellers. However, it will initially only learn a point value of the item from the
first seller. For each buyer, a computer program will decide whether to buy from
the initial seller or to search the market to discover its value for the other seller’s
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item. At this point, the buyer will have the option to buy from the second seller
and may have the option to buy from the first seller.
Two types of offers
You can make two types of offers:
Offer A: if a buyer passes on the offer, the offer will be no longer available for
her (but still available for others). In other words, Offer A is only accessible at the
initial visit for each buyer.
Offer B: if a buyer passes the offer, she can come back later to purchase. In
other words, Offer B is always available to buyers.
Value of each item
Each buyer’s value of each item is independently and randomly drawn from a
deck of 8 cards with values of 10, 25, 40, 55, 65, 65, 70, 70.
In other words, each buyer’s value will have a probability of 1/8 to be 10, 25,
40, 55 for each of these values and 2/8 to be 65, 70. Each time when a buyer
(computer buyer) makes a draw, she makes a draw from a new deck of 8 cards.
(independently and randomly drawn)
Your payment
You will get paid for only one period. After 20 periods of the game, you will
need to draw a number to determine the period. You will get paid based on
the profit you have made in that period. Since you do not know which period
the payment will be based on, you should do your best for every period. The
conversion rate for the game is one point = 4 cents. In other words, if you earn x
points, you will get 4*x cents + $5 for a show-up payment.
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Summary
You are a seller in amarket of 2 sellers and 24 computer buyers. In each period,
you need to choose a price and an offer type for your items. The price and the offer
type will be the same for all buyers in the market. Remember that, an offer of type
A will not be available to any buyers who examine your item first and choose to
examine the item of the other seller. An offer of type B will always be available.
After you have made a decision, 24 computer buyers will visit the market and
make purchase attempts:
1. All buyers will immediately learn the prices and offer types of both sellers.
2. Half of the buyers (12 buyers) will visit you first and immediately learn the
value of your item. These values are determined at random from 8 cards of
10, 25, 40, 55, 65, 65, 70, 70.
3. The above buyers will make decisions whether to buy your item or examine
the item of the other seller. You will earn points equal to the price you charge
for every item you sell.
4. The other 12 buyers will visit and learn the value of the other seller’s item
first. They may choose to buy that item immediately or alternatively to
examine the value of your item. You will earn points equal to the price you
charge for every item you sell.
5. If you use an offer B, buyers who examine your item first (in step 3), and
choose to examine the item of the other seller, will still have an opportunity
to buy your item. On the other hand, if you use an offer A, those buyers
will not have the opportunity to buy your item. That is Offer A only allows
initial purchase, not a later recall.
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This process will be repeated for twenty periods. You will be randomly
matched with different sellers in each period.
The payment will be randomly paid from one period and the conversion rate
is one point = 4 cents.
2. Sessions with Human Buyers
In this treatment, each participant was assigned a role as either a seller or a
buyer. All participants were given the same instructions until the summary page
(the last page of the instructions) that they were told their roles in the experiment.
Instructions
Today, you will be participating in an economics experiment. The experiment
tests how people make decisions involving money. The decisions you make in
this experiment will determine your earnings, which will be converted to cash
and paid at the end of this session. You will make all of these decisions on the
computer in front of you. Please pay attention to these instructions so you will
understand how to make money.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand, and the experimenter will
quietly answer your question. Please do not talk to any other person during this
experiment.
There are 24 participants in the session today. 16 participants will be assigned
as buyers and 8 participants will be assigned as sellers. You will know your
assigned role when we get into a summary page. Your role will be fixed for the
entire 20 periods. In each period, there are 4 markets and each market consists of
2 sellers and 4 buyers. You will be randomly selected into one of the 4 markets.
There are 2 sellers and 4 buyers in each market. Each buyer will make 6
purchase attempts, so in total there are 24 purchase attempts. For each attempt,
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each buyer will visit the sellers in the market sequentially. Sellers are endowed
with supply of items andwill choose aprice and an offer type (will explain later) for
all buyers. Each seller has enough items to sell to every buyer and the production
cost is 0. Buyers will randomly encounter a seller’s item and choose to buy that
item or search to examine the other seller’s item for 6 attempts. 2 buyers will visit
one firm first and the other 2 buyers will visit the other firm first. In other words,
12 purchase attempts will visit one seller first and the other 12 purchase attempts
will visit the other seller first. Each buyer has no cost to search. Depending on the
terms of the first seller’s offer, examining the second seller’s item may cause the
first seller’s offer to be no longer available.
Decisions
There are 2 sellers and 4 buyers in each market. Each buyer will make 6
purchase attempts, so in total there are 24 purchase attempts.
The 2 sellers will choose to set a price which can be 25, 30 or 35. Along with
setting the price, the sellers can also choose one of two offer types. A price and an
offer type will be the same for all buyers in the market. These offer types will be
explained on the next page.
In each attempt, each buyer has a specific, randomly determined, point value
for each seller’s item. This value is randomly determined from a distribution that
will be explained in more detail later.
Each buyer will immediately learn the prices and the offer types of both sellers.
However, for each attempt she will initially only learn a point value for the item
of one seller. A buyer must decide whether to buy from the initial seller or search
the market to discover a point value for the item of the other seller. At this point, a
buyer will have the option to buy from the second seller and may have the option
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to buy from the first seller.
Each seller will earn points equal to her price multiplied by the quantity sold.
Each buyer will earn points equal to her point value for that item minus the
item’s price. For example, if a buyer buys an item worth x points, at a price of y,
she will earn x-y points. A buyer will earn 0 points if she does not buy an item.
Two types of offers
Sellers can make two types of offers:
Offer A: if a buyer passes on the offer, the offer will be no longer available for
her (but still available for others). In other words, Offer A is only accessible at the
initial visit for each buyer.
Offer B: if a buyer passes the offer, she can come back later to purchase. In
other words, Offer B is always available to buyers.
Value of each item
Each buyer’s value of each item is independently and randomly drawn from a
deck of 8 cards with values of 10, 25, 40, 55, 65, 65, 70, 70.
In other words, each buyer’s value will have a probability of 1/8 to be 10, 25,
40, 55 for each of these values and 2/8 to be 65, 70. Each time when a buyer
(computer buyer) makes a draw, she makes a draw from a new deck of 8 cards.
(independently and randomly drawn)
Your payment
Each seller will get paid for only one period. After 20 periods of the game, each
seller will need to draw a number (from 1 to 20) to determine a period. She will
get paid based on the profit she has made in that period.
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Each buyer will get paid for only one attempt in one period. Similar to sellers,
each buyer needs to draw 2 numbers at the end to determine a period (from 1 to
20) and an attempt (from 1 to 6). She will get paid based on the profit she has
made with that attempt in that period.
Since you do not know which period and attempt (for buyers) the payment
will be based on, you should do your best for every period and every attempt.
The conversion rates are one point = 4 cents for sellers and one point = 50 cents
for buyers. In other words, if you earn x points, you will earn 4*x cents + $5 for a
show-up payment if you are a seller and 50*x cents + $5 for a show-up payment if
you are a buyer.
Sellers’ summary
Summary (You are a Seller)
As a seller you will choose a price and an offer type for your items. The price
and the offer type will be the same for all buyers in the market. An offer of type
A will not be available to any buyers who examine your item first and choose to
examine the item of the other seller. An offer of type B will always be available for
buyers.
After you have made your pricing decisions, 24 purchase attempts from 4
participants will visit the market and make purchase attempts:
1. All buyers will immediately learn the prices and the offer types of both
sellers.
2. Half of the buyers (12 attempts from 2 participants) will visit you first and
immediately learn the value of your item. These values are determined at
random from 8 cards of 10, 25, 40, 55, 65, 65, 70, 70.
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3. The above buyers will make decisions whether to buy your item or examine
the item of the other seller. You will earn points equal to the price you charge
for every item you sell.
4. The other 12 purchase attempts (from the other 2 participants) will visit and
learn the value of the other seller’s item first. They may choose to buy that
item immediately or alternatively to examine the value of your item. You
will earn points equal to the price you charge for every item you sell.
5. If you use an offer B, buyers who examine your item first (in step 3), and
choose to examine the item of the other seller, will still have an opportunity
to buy your item. On the other hand, if you use an offer A, those buyers
will not have the opportunity to buy your item. That is Offer A only allows
initial purchase, not a later recall.
This process will be repeated for twenty periods. You will be randomly
matched with different seller and buyers each period.
The payment will be randomly paid from one period and the conversion rate
is one point = 4 cents.
The payment for buyers will be randomly paid from one item in one period
and the conversion rate is one point = 50 cents.
Buyers’ summary
Summary (You are a Buyer)
As a buyer you will make 6 purchase attempts in each period. You will imme-
diately learn priced and offer types of both sellers. However, you will only learn
the point value of the item from the first seller. You can choose to buy an item or
to examine the point value of the item from the other seller.
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That is, for each of the 6 purchase attempts:
1. You choose whether to buy an item from seller 1 or examine the item from
seller 2. Depending on the type of offer, examining the item from seller 2
may remove the opportunity for that specific attempt to purchase from seller
1.
2. After examining the item from seller 2 and learning the point value for the
item, you will have an opportunity to buy from seller 2.
3. If seller 1makes an ”Offer B”, you will have an opportunity to return to seller
1 and buy the item. However, if seller 1 makes an ”Offer A”, you will not
have that opportunity.
4. Your earning is equal to your point value for the itemminus the price. If you
do not buy any items, your earning will be zero for that item.
This process will be repeated for twenty periods. Your group will be randomly
matched each period.
The payment will be randomly paid from one item in one period and the
conversion rate is one point = 50 cents.
The payment for sellers will be randomly paid from one period and the con-
version rate is one point = 4 cents.
B.1.2 Sessions with Human Buyers
In this treatment, each participant was assigned a role as either a seller or a
buyer. All participants were given the same instructions until the summary page
(the last page of the instructions) that they were told their roles in the experiment.
Instructions
Today, you will be participating in an economics experiment. The experiment
tests how people make decisions involving money. The decisions you make in
this experiment will determine your earnings, which will be converted to cash
and paid at the end of this session. You will make all of these decisions on the
computer in front of you. Please pay attention to these instructions so you will
understand how to make money.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand, and the experimenter will
quietly answer your question. Please do not talk to any other person during this
experiment.
There are 24 participants in the session today. 16 participants will be assigned
as buyers and 8 participants will be assigned as sellers. You will know your
assigned role when we get into a summary page. Your role will be fixed for the
entire 20 periods. In each period, there are 4 markets and each market consists of
2 sellers and 4 buyers. You will be randomly selected into one of the 4 markets.
There are 2 sellers and 4 buyers in each market. Each buyer will make 6
purchase attempts, so in total there are 24 purchase attempts. For each attempt,
each buyer will visit the sellers in the market sequentially. Sellers are endowed
with supply of items andwill choose aprice and an offer type (will explain later) for
all buyers. Each seller has enough items to sell to every buyer and the production
cost is 0. Buyers will randomly encounter a seller’s item and choose to buy that
item or search to examine the other seller’s item for 6 attempts. 2 buyers will visit
one firm first and the other 2 buyers will visit the other firm first. In other words,
12 purchase attempts will visit one seller first and the other 12 purchase attempts
will visit the other seller first. Each buyer has no cost to search. Depending on the
terms of the first seller’s offer, examining the second seller’s item may cause the
first seller’s offer to be no longer available.
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Decisions
There are 2 sellers and 4 buyers in each market. Each buyer will make 6
purchase attempts, so in total there are 24 purchase attempts.
The 2 sellers will choose to set a price which can be 25, 30 or 35. Along with
setting the price, the sellers can also choose one of two offer types. A price and an
offer type will be the same for all buyers in the market. These offer types will be
explained on the next page.
In each attempt, each buyer has a specific, randomly determined, point value
for each seller’s item. This value is randomly determined from a distribution that
will be explained in more detail later.
Each buyer will immediately learn the prices and the offer types of both sellers.
However, for each attempt she will initially only learn a point value for the item
of one seller. A buyer must decide whether to buy from the initial seller or search
the market to discover a point value for the item of the other seller. At this point, a
buyer will have the option to buy from the second seller and may have the option
to buy from the first seller.
Each seller will earn points equal to her price multiplied by the quantity sold.
Each buyer will earn points equal to her point value for that item minus the
item’s price. For example, if a buyer buys an item worth x points, at a price of y,
she will earn x-y points. A buyer will earn 0 points if she does not buy an item.
Two types of offers
Sellers can make two types of offers:
Offer A: if a buyer passes on the offer, the offer will be no longer available for
her (but still available for others). In other words, Offer A is only accessible at the
initial visit for each buyer.
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Offer B: if a buyer passes the offer, she can come back later to purchase. In
other words, Offer B is always available to buyers.
Value of each item
Each buyer’s value of each item is independently and randomly drawn from a
deck of 8 cards with values of 10, 25, 40, 55, 65, 65, 70, 70.
In other words, each buyer’s value will have a probability of 1/8 to be 10, 25,
40, 55 for each of these values and 2/8 to be 65, 70. Each time when a buyer
(computer buyer) makes a draw, she makes a draw from a new deck of 8 cards.
(independently and randomly drawn)
Your payment
Each seller will get paid for only one period. After 20 periods of the game, each
seller will need to draw a number (from 1 to 20) to determine a period. She will
get paid based on the profit she has made in that period.
Each buyer will get paid for only one attempt in one period. Similar to sellers,
each buyer needs to draw 2 numbers at the end to determine a period (from 1 to
20) and an attempt (from 1 to 6). She will get paid based on the profit she has
made with that attempt in that period.
Since you do not know which period and attempt (for buyers) the payment
will be based on, you should do your best for every period and every attempt.
The conversion rates are one point = 4 cents for sellers and one point = 50 cents
for buyers. In other words, if you earn x points, you will earn 4*x cents + $5 for a
show-up payment if you are a seller and 50*x cents + $5 for a show-up payment if
you are a buyer.
Sellers’ summary
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Summary (You are a Seller)
As a seller you will choose a price and an offer type for your items. The price
and the offer type will be the same for all buyers in the market. An offer of type
A will not be available to any buyers who examine your item first and choose to
examine the item of the other seller. An offer of type B will always be available for
buyers.
After you have made your pricing decisions, 24 purchase attempts from 4
participants will visit the market and make purchase attempts:
1. All buyers will immediately learn the prices and the offer types of both
sellers.
2. Half of the buyers (12 attempts from 2 participants) will visit you first and
immediately learn the value of your item. These values are determined at
random from 8 cards of 10, 25, 40, 55, 65, 65, 70, 70.
3. The above buyers will make decisions whether to buy your item or examine
the item of the other seller. You will earn points equal to the price you charge
for every item you sell.
4. The other 12 purchase attempts (from the other 2 participants) will visit and
learn the value of the other seller’s item first. They may choose to buy that
item immediately or alternatively to examine the value of your item. You
will earn points equal to the price you charge for every item you sell.
5. If you use an offer B, buyers who examine your item first (in step 3), and
choose to examine the item of the other seller, will still have an opportunity
to buy your item. On the other hand, if you use an offer A, those buyers
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will not have the opportunity to buy your item. That is Offer A only allows
initial purchase, not a later recall.
This process will be repeated for twenty periods. You will be randomly
matched with different seller and buyers each period.
The payment will be randomly paid from one period and the conversion rate
is one point = 4 cents.
The payment for buyers will be randomly paid from one item in one period
and the conversion rate is one point = 50 cents.
Buyers’ summary
Summary (You are a Buyer)
As a buyer you will make 6 purchase attempts in each period. You will imme-
diately learn priced and offer types of both sellers. However, you will only learn
the point value of the item from the first seller. You can choose to buy an item or
to examine the point value of the item from the other seller.
That is, for each of the 6 purchase attempts:
1. You choose whether to buy an item from seller 1 or examine the item from
seller 2. Depending on the type of offer, examining the item from seller 2
may remove the opportunity for that specific attempt to purchase from seller
1.
2. After examining the item from seller 2 and learning the point value for the
item, you will have an opportunity to buy from seller 2.
3. If seller 1makes an ”Offer B”, you will have an opportunity to return to seller
1 and buy the item. However, if seller 1 makes an ”Offer A”, you will not
have that opportunity.
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4. Your earning is equal to your point value for the itemminus the price. If you
do not buy any items, your earning will be zero for that item.
This process will be repeated for twenty periods. Your group will be randomly
matched each period.
The payment will be randomly paid from one item in one period and the
conversion rate is one point = 50 cents.
The payment for sellers will be randomly paid from one period and the con-
version rate is one point = 4 cents.
B.2 User Interface
98
99
100
101
102
